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In many markets, when (or whether) an agent trades, and at what price, depends on 
his own characteristics (his value,  or the cost or quality of his good), as well  as on 
the characteristics of the other traders.  In the market for  new assistant professors of 
economics,  for  example,  high-quality job candidates tend to leave the market  (i.e., 
to accept job offers)  earlier than low-quality candidates.  In the clothing market, 
high-value buyers purchase the new fall fashions as soon as the clothes enter stores, 
whereas low-value buyers purchase later in the season once the clothes go  on sale. 
The distribution of the characteristics of active traders also varies over time:  In the 
market for new assistant professors, for example, the proportion of active candidates 
that are of high quality is larger when the market opens than when it closes.  In these 
markets the "trading pattern" at each date (i.e.,  which types of buyers and sellers 
trade), and the "market composition"  at each date (i.e., the characteristics of active 
traders), are determined endogenously. 
In this paper we introduce a simple model of a market, and we characterize the 
trading patterns that arise in equilibrium as  well  as their dynamics  (that is,  when 
more than one trading pattern arises,  we  identify the possible transitions from one 
trading pattern to the next).  We  also  determine how the trading pattern depends 
on the market composition.  ·With these results in hand, we  establish that market 
equilibria may be inefficient  (and may even exhibit trading delay),  and we  obtain 
results on the competitiveness of nearly frictionless markets. 
We study a market for  an indivisible good that operates over a finite number of 
periods.  There are two  types of buyers,  whose values  are either  "high"  or  "low," 
initially present in the market in given proportions.  All sellers can supply a unit of 
the good at equal cost.  After the market opens there is no further entry.  Each period, 
active traders are randomly matched and bargain bilaterally.  In the bargaining game 
one of the traders is  randomly selected to make a take-it-or-Ieave-it price proposal. 
Bargaining is  under incomplete information,  as  a seller does not know whether his 
partner has a high or a low value. 
A variety of trading patterns are possible in this market. A "pure" trading pattern 
1 (where traders of the same type bargain the same way)  specifies (i)  whether sellers' 
price offers  are accepted by high-value buyers,  (ii)  whether sellers'  price offers  are 
accepted by low-value buyers, (iii) whether low-value buyers' price offers are accepted 
by sellers,  and (iv)  whether high-value buyers'  price offers  are accepted by sellers. 
Hence in a given date there are 16 different "pure" trading patterns. In addition, there 
are "mixed"  trading patterns in which traders of the same type bargain differently. 
There are two cases  of interest:  the "high cost"  case where sellers  have a cost 
above the value of low-value buyers (but below the value of high-value buyers), and 
the "low cost" case where the sellers' cost is below the values of both types of buyers. 
For both the high cost and the low cost case, we establish that a market equilibrium 
exists, and that as the discount factor approaches one and the time horizon becomes 
infinite, transaction prices converge to the competitive price. 
In the high cost  case the market equilibrium is  unique and symmetric (except 
for  rejected offers):  high-value buyers and sellers always trade, but low-value buyers 
never trade. 
In the low cost case, the case of primary interest, a richer set of trading patterns 
can arise.  We  establish that a  market equilibrium exhibits at most  three (pure) 
trading patterns over the life of the market.  An important variable in determining 
which trading pattern arises at each date is the proportion of high-value buyers in the 
market. In periods where high-value buyers are abundant (i.e., when their proportion 
exceeds a critical threshold we identify), the trading pattern is either separating (high-
value buyers trade, but low-value buyers do not trade) or partially-separating (high-
value buyers trade, and low-value buyers trade only when they propose).  In periods 
where  high-value  buyers  are scarce,  the trading pattern is  pooling  (both types of 
buyers trade).  We establish that the proportion of high-value buyers in the market 
is  (weakly) decreasing over time, and hence the pooling trading pattern is absorbing. 
Moreover, for  discount factors near or equal to one, the transitions from one trading 
pattern to the next are in a particular order:  from separating to partially-separating 
to pooling.  When the market transits from  one pure trading pattern to the next, 
however,  there may be a single intervening period in which the trading pattern is 
2 mixed.  (Thus, unlike in the high cost case, in this case market equilibria need not be 
symmetric. ) 
Our analysis reveals two properties of market equilibria in the low cost case that 
are in sharp contrast with Walrasian equilibria:  market equilibria may be inefficient 
and may exhibit delay.  Since efficiency in the low cost case requires that both types 
of buyers  always  trade when  matched,  the equilibrium is  inefficient  whenever  the 
separating or partially separating trading pattern arise.  Market equilibria exhibit 
delay when the trading pattern is  either separating or  partially separating at the 
market open, and it is pooling by the market close; e.g., low-value buyers do not trade 
at the market open, but do trade at later periods.  A sufficient condition for market 
equilibria to be inefficient is  that high-value buyers are abundant when the market 
opens.  If in addition the time horizon is  sufficiently long,  then there is  also delay. 
Hence both inefficiency and delay occur for a non-negligible subset of the parameter 
space.  As the market becomes frictionless the welfare loss due to inefficiency vanishes; 
delay persists, however, and in this respect frictionless markets are not competitive. 
RELATED LITERATURE 
Our results on trading patterns and their dynamics are novel and have no counter-
part in the literature.  Our findings that market equilibria may be inefficient and may 
exhibit delay, and that transaction prices are competitive as frictions vanish relate to 
results already in the literature.  We discuss these connections. 
Equilibrium  in  a market is  competitive:  There is  now  a  large literature studying 
whether decentralized markets are competitive as  frictions vanish (see,  for  example, 
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), and Gale (1987)).  With the important exception of 
Binmore and Herrero (1988),  who study markets with a single type of buyer and a 
single type of seller, the literature has focused on stationary equilibria. In the present 
paper we study dynamic markets with heterogenous traders. 
Equilibrium in markets where  agents are  asymmetrically informed:  Wolinsky (1990) 
studies convergence to rational expectations equilibrium as frictions vanish when some 
traders are uninformed about the quality of the traded good.  In  Wolinsky's model 
3 traders may bargain either  "tough"  or  "soft."  If both traders in a  match bargain 
tough, the outcome is  no trade.  Otherwise, they trade at one of three exogenously 
given prices.  The pair of bargaining positions determines at which of the three prices 
they trade.  Adopting Wolinsky's model of bargaining, in the low cost case Serrano 
and Yosha (1996) show that when frictions are small every match ends with trade (in 
our terminology, the trading pattern is pooling), and therefore that market equilibria 
are efficient.  Our results on trading patterns and their dynamics reveal that both the 
separating and partially-separating trading patterns arise in equilibrium even when 
frictions are small (in fact, even when frictions vanish).  Therefore market equilibria 
may be inefficient and exhibit delay even when frictions are small.  Our results differs 
from Serrano and Yosha's because we  place no  a priori restrictions on the prices a 
trader can offer. 1 
Market  Efficiency  and Equilibrium  Delay:  Samuelson  (1992)  models  the decision 
of traders to terminate bargaining.  In a  model of decentralized  trade and Nash 
bargaining,  Sattinger (1995)  shows  that equilibrium is  not efficient.  Jackson and 
Palfrey (1999)  show that there is a robust distribution of buyer and seller values for 
which equilibrium is inefficient for every bargaining game in a general class.  Although 
inefficiency also arises in our model, we show that as the market becomes frictionless 
the welfare loss vanishes and each trader obtains his competitive equilibriuni utility. 
It is an open question whether similar results on the efficiency of frictionless markets 
hold in Jackson and Palfrey's general framework. 
Our work  also  relates to a  large literature studying price dispersion and sales. 
Varian (1980), for example, shows that sales provide a means for sellers to price dis-
criminate between informed and uninformed consumers.  In Varian's model informed 
buyers pay the lowest offered price, while uninformed buyers purchase from each firm 
1 Wolinsky's two bargaining position model also imposes a monotonicity restriction on bargaining 
behavior as a trader's strategy is simply the number of periods in which he bargains tough (after 
which he forever bargains soft).  Example 2 shows that the monotonicity of bargaining strategies is 
not a feature of equilibrium in our model, e.g., a seller may raise his price offer from one period to 
the next. 
4 with equal likelihood.  In our model price discrimination arises as  a consequence of 
the differential willingness of high-value and low-value buyers to endure delay.  When 
equilibrium delay arises,  low-value buyers postpone trading until sellers lower their 
price offers from the high-value buyer reservation price to the low-value buyer reser-
vation price, i.e., until sellers offer a  "sale"  price. 
The paper is organized as follows:  we describe our model in Section 2.  In Section 
3 we establish that a market equilibrium exists.  We study the properties of market 
equilibria in Section 4.  In Section 5 we conclude.  Appendix A contains the proof of 
existence of equilibrium.  The remaining proofs are in Appendix B. 
2  The Model 
A market for a single indivisible commodity opens for T + 1 periods, which we denote 
by the positive integers from 0 to T.  Each seller is endowed with a single unit of the 
indivisible good.  Each buyer is endowed with one unit of money.  Buyers and sellers 
preferences are characterized by,  respectively, their values and costs:  All sellers  (8) 
have the same cost, c ~  0, whereas there are two types of buyers, "high-value" (H) and 
"low-value"  (L), whose values are, respectively, uH  and uL , where 1 ~  uH  > uL  ~  o. 
At period t  =  0 there is  a continuum of traders;  no new  traders enter the market 
subsequently.  Buyers and sellers are initially present in equal measures;  high-value 
and low-value buyers are present in the population of buyers in proportions b{f  and 
b{;  =  1 - b{f,  respectively.  We  assume throughout that uH  > c and b{f  E  (0,1).  If 
a buyer whose value is  UT  trades with a seller at the price p in time t  they obtain a 
utility of ot(u
T 
- p)  and ot(p - c),  respectively.  Here 0 E  (0,1]' the discount factor, 
expresses the traders' impatience.  A buyer or a seller who  never trades obtains a 
utility of zero. 
Each period every buyer (seller)  remaining in the market meets a randomly se-
lected seller (buyer) with probability a, where 0 < a  < 1.  A matched seller does not 
observe the buyer's value.  When a buyer and a seller meet, one of them is  selected 
randomly (with probability !) to propose a price at which to trade. If  the proposed 
5 price is accepted by the other party, then the agents trade at that price and both leave 
the market.  Otherwise, the agents remain in the market at the next date and wait 
for a new match.  An agent who is not matched in the current period also remains in 
the market at the next date.  A trader observes only the outcome of his own matches. 
A strategy for a trader of type T  E {H, L, S} is a vector of real numbers indicating 
the trader's price offers  and reservation prices at each date (Po, ···,Pr; ro, ... , rr)  = 
(pT, rT)  E  lR.2 (T+1).  The vector of prices specifies the price that an agent would propose 
at each date if matched and selected to propose a  price;  the vector of reservation 
prices specifies the maximum (minimum) price that a buyer (seller) would accept at 
each date if responding to a price offer.  A strategy distribution is a vector (p, r,..\)  = 
[(pHi  rHi  AHi)r:H  (pLi  rLi  ALi)r:L  (pSi  rSi  ASi)r:S]  where "n'T  ATk  =  1 for each T  E  ,  ,  2=1,  ,  ,  2=1,  ,  ,  2=1  ,  L...-k=l 
{H, L, S},  ..\ Tk  >  0 is  the proportion of type T  players  using strategy (pTk, rTk)  E 
lR.2(T+1) ,  and n
T  is  the (countable) number of distinct strategies used by (a positive 
measure of)  type T  traders. 
We  do not restrict attention to symmetric strategy distributions (Le.,  different 
agents of the same type T  may follow different strategies). Indeed, allowing asymmet-
ric strategy distributions is necessary to guarantee existence of a market equilibrium 
(see Example 3).  We  consider only strategies in which a trader does not condition 
his actions in the current match on the history of his prior matches.  This restriction 
is  inconsequential, since for  any equilibrium in which the players' strategies depend 
on histories, there is  another equilibrium in history-independent strategies which is 
equivalent  (i.e.,  transaction prices,  trading patterns,  and market compositions are 
the same).  For simplicity, we restrict attention to strategy distributions where only 
countably many distinct strategies are used.  As we shall see,  however,  for  discount 
factors near or equal to one, in equilibrium at most two different strategies are played 
by each type of trader. 
2.1  Laws of Motion 
Given a strategy distribution (p, r, A),  for  T  E  {H, L, S} and k  ~ n
T  let ..\?  denote 
the proportion of agents following the k-th type T  strategy out of the total measure 
6 of agents of type T  who remain in the market at time t.  (Throughout, we  use i, j, 
and k,  respectively,  to index the strategies of buyers, sellers,  and generic traders.) 
This proportion can be computed for  t E {O, ... ,T}, given  )..~k  =  )..Tk,  as 
where J.l;k  denotes the probability that a trader who is  in the market at t  and who 
follows  the strategy (P?, r?) remains in the market at the next period.  This proba-
bility is  computed as  follows:  For x, y E lR denote by J(x, y)  the indicator junction, 
whose value is  1 if x  2:  y, and 0 otherwise.  Writing B  =  {H, L} for  the set of buyer 
types, then for T  E B we have 
For sellers, this probability is given by 
n T  n'T 
Si -1  et "'bT'" \TiJ(  Ti  Si)  et "'bT'" \TiJ(  Ti  Si)  J.lt  - - 2" ~  t ~  At  rt , Pt  - 2" ~  t ~  At  Pt, r t  , 
TEE  i=l  TEE  i=l 
where b[,  the proportion of the buyers of type T  out of the total measure of buyers 
remaining in the market at time t,  can be computed for t > 0,  given bo,  as 
Since  there is  a  continuum of traders,  the market  evolves  deterministic  ally,  even 
though a trader's own market experience is stochastic. 
2.2  Value Functions 
Given a strategy distribution (p, r, )..),  the expected utility at time t  of an agent of 
type T  E {H, L, S} who is using strategy Tk is computed recursively, given  V;~l =  0, 
as 
In this expression, P?  (R?) is  the expected utility to a trader of type T  following 
the k-th type T strategy who is matched at t and selected to propose (respond to) a 
7 price offer.  These expected utilities can be calculated for  T  E B  as 
nS  nS 
Pti =  (UT - p;i) L )..;i I (p;i ,r;i) + (1 - L )..;i I (p;i ,r;i))8~~1' 
j=l  j=l 
and 
For sellers we have 
TEE  i=l  TEE  i=l 
and 
n'T  n'T 
~i  = L b;'2~ Ni (p[i  - c)I(p[i, r~i) + (1 - L b[ L )..[i I (p[i ,r~i))8~~1. 
TEE  i=l  TEE  i=l 
Note that  >.~i  is  the probability that a buyer matched at t is matched with a seller 
following  the j-th seller  strategy.  Similarly,  b[ >,;i  is  the probability that a  seller 
matched at t  is  matched with a  buyer of type  T  following  the i-th type  T  buyer 
strategy. 
2.3  Equilibrium 
A strategy distribution (p: r: >.)  is  a  market equilibrium if for  each t  E  {O, ... : T}: 
each T  E Band i E {I, ... ,nT}, and each j  E {I, ... ,nS } 
(E.1) 
UT - r[i  _  8~~\, 
s·  s·  rt J  - c  8~-:1' 
and 
(E.2) 
Condition E.1  requires that at each date a trader's reservation price makes him 
indifferent between accepting or rejecting an offer of his reservation price.  Condition 
8 E.2 ensures that price offers are optimal.  Given the recursive nature of our setting, 
in a market equilibrium traders' strategies are globally optimal, i.e., no trader can do 
better by changing his reservation prices or price offers simultaneously at more than 
one date. 
In a market equilibrium, at each date traders form their expectations of the pro-
portion of buyers of each type remaining in the market (bD,  and the proportion of 
traders following each of the strategies being played ()..?), on the basis of the strategy 
distribution being played.  Moreover,  each trader maximizes his expected utility at 
each of his information sets. Thus, the notion of market equilibrium is in the spirit of 
sequential (or Bayes perfect) equilibrium, when agents do not take their own observa-
tion of a deviation from equilibrium play as evidence that play of a positive measure 
of agents has deviated from equilibrium.  (See Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), pages 
154-162, for  a discussion of this issue for related models.) 
3  Existence of Market Equilibria 
In this section we establish that market equilibria exist under general conditions. It 
might seem that one could calculate a market equilibrium via backward induction. 
Computing a traders' reservation price and optimal price offer at a date t, however, 
requires knowing the market composition (i.e., the proportion of traders of each type 
present in the market) at t, as well as his expected utility if he remains in the market 
at t +  1.  Since the market composition at date t is determined by the trading patterns 
(and the traders' strategies) prior to t, a market equilibrium cannot be computed by 
backward induction. 
For some parameter configurations it is  easy to guess  an equilibrium sequence 
of trading patterns (e.g.,  in the high cost case,  or in the low cost case if the initial 
proportion of high-value buyers is small).  In general, however, this is a difficult task: 
although the number of "pure" trading patterns that may arise in equilibrium is small 
(as we shall see in the next section), there is a continuum of mixed trading patterns, 
differing in the proportions of traders following  different  strategies.  These mixed 
9 trading patterns cannot be neglected since  for  some parameter values  the unique 
market equilibrium has  "mixed"  trading patterns (see Example 3).  Thus, guessing 
equilibrium trading patterns in order to establish existence of equilibrium does not 
seem viable. 
Notwithstanding this difficulty, we establish in Theorem 1 that a market equilib-
rium always exists. 
Theorem 1. A  market equilibrium exists. 
Proof:  See Appendix A. 
Theorem 1 is established using a fixed point argument:  We construct a mapping 
which for  arbitrary sequences describing the trading patterns, market compositions, 
and reservation prices at each date, provides 
(i)  the trading patterns arising when traders make optimal price offers for the given 
sequence of market compositions and reservation prices, and 
(ii)  the sequence of market compositions and reservation prices that results from 
the sequence of trading patterns obtained in (i). 
As this description suggests, the "equilibrium mapping"  is a composition of two 
mappings.  The first  mapping turns out to be an upper hemicontinuous non-empty 
compact convex valued correspondence. The second mapping is a continuous function. 
In general, the result of this composition need not yield a convex valued correspon-
dence, a property required to use Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem. Nevertheless, we 
are able to establish existence of a fixed point using Cellina's Theorem.  From a fixed 
point of this mapping we construct a strategy distribution which we show is a market 
equilibrium. 
4  Properties of Market Equilibria 
We study the properties of market equilibria for  the two cases of interest:  the high 
cost case (i.e., uH  > c > uL ), and the low cost case (i.e.,  uH  > uL  > c).  We study 
10 these two cases in turn. 
4.1  Properties of market equilibria in the high cost case 
Supply and demand schedules in this case are illustrated below in Figure 1.  Beginning 
with this case allows us to discuss the workings of our model in a simple environment 
and facilitates  understanding the subtleties that arise in the more interesting case 
where there are gains to trade between sellers and both types of buyers. 
Figure 1 goes here. 
Market equilibria in this case have a simple structure:  at every date high-value 
(low-value)  buyers offer  a  price  equal to (below)  the seller  reservation price,  and 
sellers offer a price equal to the high-value-buyer reservation price.  Thus, only high-
value buyers, and the sellers they are matched with, trade.  We provide an informal 
discussion of these results. 
Let (p, r, >.)  be a market equilibrium.  As  an agent who does not trade while the 
market is  open obtains a  utility of zero  (i.e.,  Vi+l  =  0),  by El reservation prices 
at the last  date are r¥ =  u
H
,  r~ =  u
L
,  and  r~ =  c.  Hence r¥ >  r~ >  r~. It 
is  easy to see  that high-value  (low-value)  buyers offer  at date T  a  price equal to 
(belm'.T)  the seller-reservation price:  A high-value (low-value)  buyer obtains a utility 
of 'UH  - r~ =  u
H 
- C  >  0  (1.1L  - r~ =  uL  - C  < 0)  offering  r~, the lowest  price 
accepted by sellers,  and obtains 8V,f!+l  =  0  (8Vf:+l  =  0)  with a  lower  price offer. 
Thus, p!f.  =  r~ (p~ <  r~).  Sellers offer at date T  the high-value-buyer reservation 
price (i.e.,  the highest price accepted by high-value buyers):  a seller who offers r¥ 
obtains an expected utility of b!f. (r¥ - c)  =  b!f. (uH  - c)  >  0,  whereas he obtains 
r~ - c =  uL - C < 0 offering r¥.2  Thus, Pf  =  r¥- Hence the pattern of trade at 
date T  is  separating:  all matched high-value buyers trade, low-value buyers do not 
trade, and sellers only trade when matched to a high-value buyer.  Therefore traders' 
expected utilities at T  are V,f! = HuH  - c), v,f = 0,  and vI =  ~b!f. (uH  - c). 
2Note that b!f.  is strictly positive since a measure (1 - a.)Tb{! > 0 of high-value buyers has never 
been matched before T,  and therefore at least this measure of high-value buyers remains in the 
market at T. 
11 Now,  using El again we  calculate traders' reservation prices at T - 1 to obtain 
r¥_l = uH - 8~(uH - c),  r~_l = c +  8~b¥(uH - c),  and r~_l = u
L
.  Thus r¥_l > 
r~_l > rf_l' regardless of the value of b!f.,  and the same pattern of trade arises at 
date T - 1.  In fact, it can be shown by induction that reservation prices satisfy this 
inequality at every date t, independently of bP, and therefore that the pattern of trade 
is separating at every date. 
Given the initial proportion of high-value buyers in the market and knowing the 
pattern of trade at each date, we can compute the entire evolution of the market com-
position (i.e., the sequence {bP};=o).  Knowing the trading pattern and the market 
composition at each date,  the sequence of reservation prices is  then computed re-
cursively.  Transaction prices are the seller-reservation price when high-value buyers 
propose, and the high-value-buyer reservation price when sellers propose.  The market 
equilibrium is therefore unique and symmetric, except for low-value-buyer price offers 
(which are not determined). 
When traders are sufficiently patient (i.e., 8 is close to one) and the time horizon is 
sufficiently long, transaction prices at a given date are close to the competitive price 
(the sellers'  cost in this case).  Intuitively this is  because when the time horizon is 
long, high-value buyers eventually become so scarce that the seller-reservation price 
approaches their cost.  Since the probability of a future match is close to one (because 
the time horizon is  long and the matching probabilities are constant), if high-value 
buyers do not discount future utilities very much, then their cost of waiting is small, 
and therefore their reservation price also approaches the sellers' cost. 
These findings are summarized in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1.  Assume uH > c > uL . 
(P.I) Let (p, r,,x)  be  a market equilibrium and f E {O, ... ,T}. 
Reservation Prices: 
(P1.1.I) r? =  rf for every T  E {H,L,S} and i  ~  n
T
• 
(PI.l.2) rr > rf > rf· 
Price Offers: 
(PI.I.3) pPi  =  rf for i  ~  nH, pfi < rf for i  ~  nL ,  and pfj =  rr for j  ~  nS. 
12 Market Composition: 
(  )  b
H  - (l-a)W  bH 
Pl.1.4  [+1  - (l-a)W+l-W <  [. 
{P.2} For 8 E (0,1]' and T  < 00, let r(8, T) be the sequence of equilibrium reservation 
pnces. 
Transaction Prices as Frictions  Vanish: 
{Pl.2.1} limo-> 1 limT-> 00 rf(8, T) =  limT->oo limO->l rf(8, T) =  c. 
{Pl.2.2} limo->llimT--+oo rf  (8, T) = limT--+oo limo--+l rf  (8, T) = c. 
Example 1 below illustrates the results of Proposition 1. 
Example 1. Figure 2 shows equilibrium transaction prices for  a market that opens 
for 10 periods and whose parameter values are the ones specified. 
Figure 2 goes here. 
Seller price offers are not monotonic,  as  price offers at first decrease as time passes, 
but later increase.  There are two effects  at work:  The first  effect  is  that as  time 
passes high-value buyers become scarce,  which lowers the reservation price of both 
sellers and high-value buyers.  The second effect is that as time passes the end of the 
horizon approaches, which raises the reservation price of high-value buyers.  At the 
market open the first effect dominates and the reservation price of high-value buyers 
is  falling,  while  near the market close  the second effect  dominates and high-value 
buyer reservation price is rising. 
The mean transaction price (weighted by the volume of trade) is  .4308 which is 
near reservation prices in the first  few  periods since most trade occurs within the 
first  few  periods.  In the competitive equilibrium of this market, the price is  .2  and 
the entire surplus of .7520  goes  to high-value buyers.  In  contrast,  in the market 
equilibrium sellers capture 29%  of the total (discounted)  surplus of .6834,  in spite 
of the fact that frictions  are relatively small (the probability that an agent is never 
matched is  a
T+
1 =  lO~4)'  Even when 8 =  1,  sellers capture 15% of the total surplus 
of .7513.  Finally,  the equilibrium is  efficient since all matches between sellers and 
high-value buyers end with trade. 
13 4.2  Properties of market equilibria in the low cost case 
Figure 3 below illustrates the supply and demand schedules for this case.  We identify 
the trading patterns which may arise in equilibrium and identify the transitions among 
them.  We  also relate the trading pattern to the market composition,  and describe 
how the market composition evolves over time.  We show that if the initial proportion 
of high-value buyers in the market is  above a critical threshold we  identify, then in 
a  market  equilibrium trade is  inefficient.  If in addition the time horizon is  long 
then a  market  equilibrium  also  exhibits  delay.  Finally,  we  show  that as  market 
frictions  vanish  (i.e.,  as  the discount factor  approaches one and the time horizon 
grows  long),  equilibrium transaction prices  converge to a  competitive equilibrium 
price.  We  establish that in the limit equilibrium delay persists,  although its cost 
vanishes. 
Figure 3 goes here. 
In order to illustrate the difficulties that arise in the analysis of the present case, 
assume, for the purpose of discussion, that in a market equilibrium (i) traders of the 
same type have the same reservation price, (ii) sellers offer either the high-value-buyer 
reservation price r[I,  or the low-value-buyer reservation price rf, and (iii) r[I  > rf·3 
\-Vhen a seller offers r[I  at date t, he trades only with high-value buyers and obtains 
an expected utility of 
bf  (rf - c) + (1 - bf)(rf - c). 
(Recall that 8~~1 =  rf - c by El.) A seller who offers rf at date t trades with both 
types of buyers, and obtains rf - c.  Therefore it is optimal for  a seller to offer the 
high-value-buyer reservation price if 
bf(rf - c) + (1- bf)(rf - c)  ~  rt - c, 
i.e., 
bH(  H  S) >  L  S  t  rt  - rt  _  rt  - rt  . 
3Each of these facts is proven in Appendix B. 
14 In other words,  sellers offer the high-value-buyer reservation price if the probability 
that the current partner is a high-value buyer times the gains to trade with high-value 
buyers is  greater than the gains to trade with low-value buyers.  (In both cases, the 
gains are calculated relative to the reservation prices, rather than the actual values 
or costs.)  Writing trt for the ratio (rf - rf)j(rf! - rf), which measures the relative 
gains to trade of sellers with low-value buyers versus high-value buyers, the inequality 
above can be written as 
Hence,  in contrast to the low-cost case where the pattern of trade is  separating re-
gardless of the market composition, in the present case the pattern of trade at date 
t depends on the market composition.  Further, the market composition at date t is 
determined in turn by the trading patterns prior to t.  Thus, the entire sequence of 
trading patterns and market compositions must be determined simultaneously. 
In spite of this difficulty,  we identify the basic properties of market equilibria in 
propositions 2 through 4.  Proposition 2 establishes some basic facts about equilibrium 
price offers and reservation prices. 
Proposition 2.  Assume that uH  > uL  > c.  Let (p, r, A)  be  a market equilibrium and 
let lE {a, ... ,T}. 
Reserua.tion Prices: 
(P2.1.1) r? =  r[ for every T  E {H, L, S} and i  :::;  n
T
• 
(P2.1.2) r? > max{rt, rf}. 
High- Va.lue-Buyer Price Offers: 
(P2.2) pPi  =  rf, for every i  :::; nH . 
Low-Value-Buyer Price Offers: 
(P2.3.1) pfi  :::; rf for every i  :::;  nL . 
(P2.3.2)  There is c(a, T) > 0 such that for 8> 1 - c(a, T): 
(i) If pfi < rf for some i  :::;  nL ,  then pf; < rf for every t < land i  :::;  nL . 
(ii) If pfi = rf for some i :::;  nL ,  then pfi = rf for every t > t and i  :::;  nL . 
Seller Price Offers: 
15 (P2.4.1) pfj E {rf,rf} for every j:::; nS. 
(P2·4.2) If pfj = rf for some j  :::; nS, then p~j = rf for every t > f and j  :::;  nS. 
(P2.4.3) If pfj = rf for some j  :::;  nS, then p~j = r{f for every t < f and j  :::;  nS. 
Seller and Low-Value-Buyer Price Offers: 
(P2.5) If pfj = rf for some j  :::;  nS, then pti = rf for every i  :::;  nL . 
In a  market equilibrium all traders of the same type have identical reservation 
prices (P2.1.1).  The high-value-buyer reservation price is above both the low-value-
buyer and seller reservation prices (P2.1.2). High-value buyers offer sellers their reser-
vation price (P2.2).  If the discount factor is sufficiently large, low-value buyers may 
initially offer sellers a price below their reservation price, but once a positive propor-
tion of low-value buyers offers the seller reservation price, then all low-value buyers 
offer this price at every subsequent date (P2.3.2).  Similarly, seller's may initially of-
fer the high-value-buyer reservation price (P2.4.3), but once a positive proportion of 
sellers offers the low-value-buyer reservation price, all sellers offer this price at every 
subsequent date (P2.4.2).  Finally,  if at date t  a positive proportion of sellers offer 
the low-value buyer reservation price, then at date t all low-value buyers offer sellers 
their reservation price (P2.5). 
TRADIXG PATTERNS 
We begin by discussing which trading patterns may arise in equilibrium. A "pure" 
trading pattern, in which agents of the same type make the same price offers, specifies 
whether sellers' price offers are accepted by high-value buyers, whether sellers' price 
offers  are accepted by low-value buyers,  whether low-value buyers' price offers  are 
accepted by sellers, and whether high-value buyers' price offers are accepted by sellers. 
There are 16 possible pure trading patterns. 
Proposition 2 implies that at most three of these pure trading patterns may arise 
in equilibrium:  Sellers'  price offers  are accepted by high-value buyers (P2.1.2  and 
P2.4.1).  High-value buyers' price offers are accepted by sellers (P2.2).  Hence P2.1.2, 
P2.2,  and P2.4.1  rule out all  but four  of the feasible  pure trading patterns.  In 
addition, P2.5 rules out the trading pattern in which sellers' price offers are accepted 
16 by both types of buyers, but low-value buyers' price offers are not accepted by sellers. 
Thus,  only three pure trading patterns may arise in equilibrium:  a  separating  (S) 
trading pattern, where only matches between high-value buyers and sellers end with 
trade; a partially-separating (PS) trading pattern, where matches between high-value 
buyers and sellers end with trade and matches between low-value buyers and sellers 
end with trade only if the buyer proposes; and a pooling (P) trading pattern, where 
all matches end with trade.  The relation between price offers and reservation prices 
in each of these trading patterns are described in Table I. 
Trading Patterns  Price Offers 
Sellers  High-Value  Low-Value 
Separating  ps _  rH 
t  - t  pH -rS  t  - t  pL < rS  t  t 
Partially-Separating  ps _  rH 
t  - t  pH _  rS 
t  - t  pL _  rS 
t  - t 
Pooling  ps _  rL 
t  - t  pH _  rS 
t  - t  pL _  rS 
t  - t 
TABLE I:  Equilibrium Pure Trading Patterns when u
H  > u
L  > c. 
In addition to the three  "pure"  trading patterns, an equilibrium may also  have 
"mixed" ones (i.e., ones in which traders of the same type make different price offers). 
In particular, an equilibrium may have "S-PS" trading patterns and "PS-P" trading 
patter!1.-S.  The S-PS trading pattern is the same as S,  except that low-value buyers 
::mix,"  i.e.,  a  positive proportion offer  the seller  reservation price,  and a  positive 
proportion offer a price below the seller reservation price.  The PS-P trading pattern 
is  the same as  PS, except that sellers  "mix,"  i.e.,  a  positive proportion offer  the 
high-value-buyer reservation price and a positive proportion offer the low-value-buyer 
reservation price. 
Proposition 2 ensures that the PS-P trading pattern arises in at most one period 
(P2.4.3).  Moreover,  when the discount factor is  sufficiently high, the S-PS trading 
pattern arises also in at most one period, since by P2.3.2 once a positive proportion of 
low-value buyers offer the seller reservation price, at subsequent periods all low-value 
buyers offer this price. 
17 DYNAMICS OF TRADING  PATTERNS 
Proposition 2 also yields conclusions concerning the order in which trading pat-
terns arise in equilibrium.  P2.4.2 establishes that if at date t  a positive proportion 
of sellers offer the low-value-buyer reservation price,  then at every subsequent date 
all sellers offer this price.  Hence the S, S-PS, and PS trading patterns (when they 
arise)  precede the PS-P and P  trading patterns.  P2.3.2 establishes that when the 
discount factor is sufficiently close to one the S trading pattern precedes all the other 
trading patterns. Furthermore, P2.4.2 and P2.3.2 imply, respectively, that the S-PS 
mixed trading pattern precedes PS, and the PS-P mixed trading pattern precedes 
P. 
It can be shown that if trading patterns Sand P  are both visited, then pattern 
PS must also be visited.  Also,  PSis always visited unless the market opens at P. 
The mixed trading patterns may be skipped, although the subset of the parameter 
space where all market equilibria exhibit mixed trading patterns is not negligible (see 
Example 3).  The dynamics of trading patterns are illustrated in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 goes here. 
MARKET  COMPOSITION 
The market composition at date t is described by bf, the proportion of high-value 
buyers in t.he  market..  Proposit.ion 3  below relat.es  t.his  proport.ion t.o  the t.rading 
pattern and the dynamics of the market composition.  Denote by 7r*  the ratio (uL  -
c)j(uH  - c). 
Proposition 3.  Assume that uH  > uL  > c.  Let (p, r, >.)  be  a market equilibrium and 
let t E  {a, ... ,T}. 
The  Critical Threshold  (7r*): 
(P3.1.1) If bp < 7r*,  then pii = rt for every j  ~  nS  and bP-t-l  = bP. 
(P3.1.2) If bp = 7r*,  then pf; = rf for every i  ~  nL ,  and either 
(i)  bP-t-l  < bP;  or 
(ii) bP-t-l  = bp, and p~i = rf for every j  ~  nS  and t 2: t. 
18 {P3.1.3} If bp> 7r*,  then p;j  =  rp for every j  ~  nS, and bf-t-l  < bP. 
The  Critical Threshold is Eventually Reached : 
{P3.2}  There is T  =  T(b/f, Q, 7r*)  such that if T> T, then  b{1  ~  7r*  for t 2: T. 
Proposition 3 therefore establishes that trading patterns and the dynamics of 
market  composition are  governed  by  the relation of the proportion of high-value 
buyers in the market to the critical threshold  7r*.  If the proportion of high-value 
buyers in the market is  below  7r*,  then the trading pattern is  P  (P3.1.1).  If the 
proportion of high-value  buyers  in the market equals  7r*,  then either the trading 
pattern is PS or PS-P and the proportion of high-value buyers in the market is less 
than 7r*  at the next period, or the trading pattern is  P  (and remains at P  at every 
subsequent period) and the proportion of high-value buyers is  7r*  at the next period 
(P3.1.2).  P3.1.1 and P3.1.2 imply that if the proportion of high-value buyers in the 
market equals 7r*  at some date, at the next date the trading pattern must be P.  If 
the proportion of high-value buyers in the market is greater than 7r*, then the trading 
pattern is  either S, S-PS, or PS (P3.1.3).  Finally,  P3.2  ensures that if the time 
horizon is sufficiently long, then eventually the proportion of high-value buyers in the 
market is less than or equal to 7r*.  Hence, by P3.1.1  and P3.1.2, if the time horizon 
is sufficiently long, then the trading pattern is eventually P. 
DYNAMICS OF MARKET COMPOSITION 
In both the S and the PS trading pattern, as well as in the mixed trading patterns 
S-PS and PS-P, the proportion of high-value buyers in the market is falling:  in S, 
each period a fraction Q  of high-value buyers exit the market, while no low-value buyer 
exits;  in PS a fraction  Q  of high-value buyers and a fraction  ~ of low-value buyers 
exit the market each period.  In the trading pattern P the same fraction  Q  of each 
type of buyer exits the market at each date, and hence the proportion of high-value 
buyers in the market remains constant.  Thus, the proportion of high-value buyers in 
the market decreases (quickly in S, and more slowly in PS), but once P  is  reached 
(i.e., once this proportion falls below 7r*), it becomes stationary. 
A numerical example in which all three trading patterns arise in equilibrium is 
19 given in Example 2. 
Example 2.  Figure 5 shows an equilibrium in which all three pure trading patterns 
arise for a market that opens for 10 periods and whose parameter values are the ones 
specified. 
Figure 5 goes here. 
The top graph in Figure 5 shows transaction prices.  The trading pattern is  S  for 
periods 0 to 2,  is PS for periods 3 to 7,  and is P for periods 8 and 9.  In period 8 the 
good goes on "sale"  as sellers switch from offering the high-value-buyer reservation 
price to the low-value-buyer reservation price.  Low-value buyers trade with delay: 
they do not trade at period 0 through 2;  they trade only if they propose in periods 
3 through 7;  and they trade whether they propose or respond in periods 8 or 9.  The 
bottom graph shows the evolution of the market composition and the ratio Kt. 
The set of competitive prices for the market in Example 2 is the interval [.2, .4]. 
We focus on the competitive price of .3, since in a market equilibrium all transactions 
are at this price as frictions vanish (see Proposition 4).  Table II shows the division of 
the surplus in three different settings:  at the competitive equilibrium price of .3;  in 
the market equilibrium displayed in Figure 5;  and under efficient trading, i.e., when 
each match ends with trade (here the distribution of the surplus is computed when 
each match ends with trade at the price of .3). 
Interestingly, in this market equilibrium sellers capture more than twice the sur-
plus than they capture in the competitive equilibrium.  The market equilibrium is 
not efficient since low-value buyers do not trade when matched in periods 0 through 
2 and trade only if they propose in periods 3 through 7.  The efficiency loss resulting 
from delay (.0045 =  .6943 - .6898) is small since only 6% of the buyers are low-value 
at the market open. 
20 High-value  Low-value  Seller  Total 
Competitive Equil.  .6580  (86%)  .0060  (.7%)  .1000  (13%)  .7640  (100%) 
Efficient Trading  .5980 (86%)  .0055  (.7%)  .0909 (13%)  .6943  (100%) 
Market Equil.  .4738 (68%)  .0033 (.4%)  .2128 (30%)  .6898 (100%) 
TABLE II: The Division of Surplus 
PRICES AS  FRICTION VANISH 
Proposition 4 below establishes that, as  frictions vanish,  transaction prices con-
verge to the competitive equilibrium price that splits the gains between low-value 
buyers and sellers equally,  i.e.,  the price (uL + c)/2.  For each 8 E  (0,1]  and integer 
T, denote by r(8, T)  the set of all sequences of equilibrium reservation prices,  and 
by V(8, T)  the set of all sequences of equilibrium expected utilities.  These sets are 
non-empty by Theorem 1. 
Proposition 4:  Assume that uH  > uL  > c.  Then jor every f and 'T  E {H, L, S} 
lim  Hm  rf(8, T) =  lim  Hm rf(8, T) =  u
L 
+ c; 
0-+1 T-+oo  T-+oo 0-+1  2 
i.e.,  transaction prices are  competitive as jrictions vanish.  Furthermore, 
jor each  'T  E {H, L}, and 
L 
Hm  Hm  v'l(8, T) =  lim  Hm v'l(8, T) = u  + c - c; 
0-+1 T-+oo  T-+oo 0-+1  2 
i. e.,  as jrictions vanish each  agent obtains his competitive equilibrium utility. 
DELAY 
Although transaction prices converge to a competitive price as market frictions 
vanish,  delay  persists  in  the limit  and,  in this sense,  the market outcome is  not 
competitive.  Consider  a  market  in which  b{f  >  7r*  and let  (p, r, >.)  be a  market 
21 equilibrium.  By Proposition 3,  so long as the proportion of buyers in the market is 
above  7r*  then the trading pattern is either S  or PS.  Define the sequence  {Q~} as 
ljf =  b{f  and, for  t  ~  0 
bH  =  (1- a)Q~ 
-HI  (1- a)bH + 1-bH ' 
-t  -t 
The sequence  {Q~} describes the evolution of the market composition as though the 
trading pattern is always S.  Since the proportion of high-value buyers in the market 
falls more quickly in S than in the other trading patterns, then bfI  ~  Q~ for all t  ~  O. 
Therefore, if t is smallest integer such that M! ::;  7r*, then we have bf > 7r*  for t < t; 
hence the trading pattern is  either S or PS for periods 0 through t - 1.  If the time 
horizon T is sufficiently long that P is eventually reached, then low-value buyers trade 
with delay:  low-value buyers do not trade when responding prior to t,  but do trade 
if responding when P is reached.  (If the market opens at the S trading pattern, then 
low-value buyers do not trade at all if matched initially, but always trade if matched 
once P  is  reached.)  Since t is  independent of the time horizon T  and the discount 
factor, equilibrium delay persists for  at least t periods even as frictions vanish. 
Equilibrium delay can be made to persist arbitrary long,  since t can be made 
arbitrarily large by choosing b{f  near 1.  Nonetheless, by Proposition 4 each trader 
receives his competitive equilibrium utility as market frictions vanish, and therefore 
delay becomes costless. 
SYMMETRY 
We  conclude by discussing the asymmetries that may arise in equilibrium.  By 
Proposition 2 all high-value buyers follow the same strategy in equilibrium.  Also, the 
equilibrium strategies of sellers must be the same at every date, except at the PS-P 
mixed trading pattern (if it arises) where both the low-value and the high-value buyer 
reservation prices are offered by a positive proportion of sellers.  Note, however, that 
reaching this mixed trading pattern requires that the proportion of high-value buyers 
exactly equal 7r*  at some date (see P3.1.2). 
As for  low-value buyers,  they all offer  the same price except in the S  or S-PS 
trading pattern. In S,  low-value buyers offer prices below the seller reservation price 
22 (which sellers  reject).  Hence low-value buyer price offers  are not determined,  and 
therefore there are  asymmetric  market  equilibria in which  low-value  buyers  make 
different  (rejected)  price offers.  Nonetheless, if a  market equilibrium exhibits only 
asymmetries of this kind,  there is  also  a symmetric market equilibrium which gen-
erates the same trading pattern, market composition and transaction prices at each 
date.  There is a more significant asymmetry when the S-PS mixed trading pattern 
arises.  In  this case,  a positive proportion of low-value buyers offer the seller reser-
vation price, and a positive proportion offer prices below the seller reservation price. 
As  Example 3 shows,  there are markets whose  unique equilibrium exhibits the S-
PS trading pattern.  Hence existence of a symmetric market equilibrium cannot be 
guaranteed. 
Example 3:  Consider a market with parameter values as given in Example 2, except 
that the initial proportion of high-value buyers is now b{f  =  .92.  Also let the market 
open only for two periods (i.e., T  =  1).  Note that whatever the trading pattern is at 
date 0,  the proportion of high-value buyers at date 1 satisfies 
b
H >  (l-a)b{f  *  .4-.2 
1  - (  )bH  b H  = .85185 > 1f  =  2  = .25.  I-a  0  +1- 0  1-. 
Hence at date 1 sellers offer pr  = rf = uH  =  1.  Also  as rf > rr  (because rf 
uL  >  c = rf),  low-value  buyers offer  pf = rf =  c =  .2.  Therefore,  in a  market 
equilibrium the trading pattern at date 1 is  PS, and the traders' expected utilities 
are  1I;.H  =  ~(UH - c)  =  ~(1 - .2)  =  ~,  1I;.L  =  ~(UL - c)  =  H.4 - .2)  =  io'  and 
VIS = ~bf(uH - c) = ibf(1- .2) = ~bf, where bf remains to be determined. 
We must now determine the traders' strategies at date O.  By Proposition 2, three 
trading patterns are possible:  S,  S-PS, or PS. Suppose that the pattern of trade at 
date 0 is S. Then bf = .85185, and rg = c+811;.s = .2+  .9(~)(. 85185) = .35333. Since 
r{;  = uL - 611;.L  = .4 - .9(21 0)  = .355, we  have rg  < r{;.  But then low-value buyers 
must offer the seller reservation price at date 0 (see Lemma 2.2),  and therefore the 
pattern of trade is not S. 
Suppose that the pattern of trade at date 0 is PS. Then 
H  (1 - a)b{f 
b1  =  (1 _ a)b{f +  (1 - ~) (1 _ b{f)  =  .88462, 
23 and rg = .2 + .9( i) (.88462) = .35923 > .355 = rt. But then low-value buyers must 
offer a price below the seller reservation price at date 0 (see Lemma 2.3), and therefore 
the pattern of trade is not PS. 
Since a  market equilibrium exists,  then the trading pattern at date 0 must be 
S-PS.  Indeed,  suppose that a  proportion  )..L1  =  .29029 of low-value buyers offer 




H  =  0  = .86111 
1  (1  - a)b{f + (1  - %)..L1) (1 - b{f)  , 
and rg = .2+.9(i)(. 86111) = .355 = rt; bothp~l andp~2 are optimal offers (i.e., low-
value buyers are indifferent between trading or not trading at the sellers' reservation 
price).  Hence, the strategy distribution described is  a market equilibrium. 
5  Concluding Remarks 
Previous work studying the properties of decentralized markets in which traders are 
asymmetrically informed (e.g., Samuelson (1992), Serrano and Yosha (1996)) imposes 
ex-ante restrictions on transaction prices (forcing each transaction to be at one of at 
most three possible prices).  Such restrictions seem unnatural in models whose aim 
is  to develop a theory of price formation.  Ex-ante price restrictions may artificially 
restrict the possibilities for trade: even if a buyer and a seller, when bargaining, have 
gains to trade relative to continuing to search, there may be not be a feasible price 
below the buyer's and above the seller's reservation prices.  Price restrictions may 
also qualitatively affect  the results (e.g.,  Serrano and Yosha (1996)  find that when 
frictions  are small equilibrium is  efficient,  while we  find  that the equilibrium may 
be inefficient).  Ex-ante price restrictions also seem inconsistent with decentralized 
trading since an external authority must be relied upon to enforce them. 
In  our framework,  transaction prices, the pattern of trade, and the distribution 
of the characteristics of the active traders are determined endogenously.  Our results 
contribute to understanding how in markets these variables are interrelated and how 
they evolve dynamically over time.  Our findings illustrate that markets may exhibit 
24 interesting dynamics,  and these dynamics  persist  as  frictions  vanish even  though 
transaction prices become competitive.  The model we  introduce is useful for  inves-
tigating how the institutional setting (i.e.,  the bargaining rules)  and the nature of 
uncertainty (i.e., whether it is one-sided or two-sided) influence market dynamics and 
the properties of market equilibria.  These are important issues which we  leave for 
future research. 
6  Appendix A:  Existence of Market Equilibria 
We establish existence of a market equilibrium by means of a fixed point argument. 
Market outcomes are completely described by a triple (z, (3, p) specifying, respectively, 
the trading pattern, market composition, and reservation prices at each date.  As we 
establish in Appendix B,  in equilibrium high-value buyers offer the seller reservation 
price (L6.1);  low value buyers offer the seller reservation price or less (L2);  and sellers 
offer either the high-value or low-value buyer reservation price (L3.1).  Thus, we can 
simplify the representation of trading patterns by focusing on the proportion zf of 
low-value buyers who offer the seller reservation price and the proportion zf of sellers 
who offer  the low-value buyer reservation price.  (Then 1 - zf is  the proportion of 
low-value  buyers offering  a  price below rf and 1 - zf  is  the proportion of sellers 
offering the price rfl.)  The sequence of equilibrium trading patterns is represented as 
Z  =  (zo, ... ,zr), where Zt =  (z;, zi) E  [0, IF.  The market composition at each date 
is  described by (3  =  ((30,· .. ,(3r), where (3t  E  [0,1]  is the proportion of buyers in the 
market at date t who have a high value.  Reservation prices at each date are given by 
P = (Po,···  ,Pr), where Pt = (pfl,Pt,pf) E [0,1]3. 
The strategy of the proof of existence is  as follows:  we  construct a mapping  r.p 
which for each arbitrary triple (z, (3, p) provides the trading patterns that result when 
traders' price offers are optimal, and the market composition and reservation prices 
resulting from these new trading patterns.  As  we shall see the mapping r.p  is  upper 
hemicontinuous and non-empty valued, but it may not be convex valued.  Hence we 
cannot apply Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem.  Cellina (1969)  has shown, however, 
25 that if for  each (z, j3, p),  cp( z, j3, p)  is the image of a  convex set under a  continuous 
function,  then  cp  has  a  fixed  point.  Specifically,  Cellina establishes the following 
theorem:4 
Theorem (Cellina 1969,  Theorem 2).  Let K  be  a non-empty compact convex subset 
of a Banach space.  Let  cp  and, be  two  upper hemicontinuous correspondences from 
K  into  K  such  that for  each  x  E  K,  cp(x)  is  closed  and  ,(x) is  convex.  Let  f 
be  a continuous function  from  the  graph  of ,  into  K  such  that for  each  x  E  K, 
cp(x)  =  {f(x, y)  lyE ,(xn.  Then  cp  has a fixed point in K. 
With this result in hand we prove Theorem 1. 
Proof of Theorem 1:  Let T  <  00,  (uH,uL,C)  E  [0,1]3  with uH > max{uL,c}, 
b/f  E  (0,1),8 E  (0,1]' and a  E  (0,1). Write Q  =  (1  - a)Tb/f, and denote by K  the 
set of triples (z,j3,p)  such that z  E  [0, Ij2(T+1) , j3  E  [Q,b/f]T+1,  and pE [O,I]3(T+l) 
satisfies PT  = (p!j,p!;,p¥) = (uH,uL,c), and for t < T, PP - pf 2:  0,  and p[I - pr 2: 
(1  - a81-6~~;g::::r-t)(uH - c).  Note that K  c  [0,1]6(T+1)  is  a non-empty compact 
convex set. 
The mapping cp  : K  -» K  is  constructed as follows:  Let ,  : K  -» K  be given for 
(z,j3,p) E K  by ,(z,j3,p) =  (,Z(z,j3,p),j3,p), where 
{(I, In  if  j3t(p[I - pf)  <  pf - pr 
{I} x  [0,1]  if  j3t(p[I - pf)  - pf - pr 
,:(z,  j3, p)  =  {(I, on  if  j3t(p[I - pr)  >  pf - pr> ° 
[0,1]  x  {O}  if  pf - pr  °  {(O, on  if  pf - pr  <  0, 
for  each t  E  {O, ... ,T}. Note that j3t(p[I  - pf) > °  for  t  E  {O, ... ,T}, whenever 
(z, j3, p)  E K. Hence, is  well defined.  Also note that, is an upper hemicontinuous 
non-empty compact convex valued correspondence. 
Now let D be the graph of, (i.e., the set {(z, j3, p; z, /3, p) I  (z, /3, p)  E ,(z,  j3, pn), 
and let f  : D -4 K be given for (z, j3, p; z, /3, p)  E D by f(z, j3, p; z, /3, p)  =  (z, 9(z), h(z, /3, p)), 
4See also Border (1985), Theorem 15.1, page 72. 
26 where 9 is defined as go(z)  =  b!f,  and for t > ° 
(2)  =  (1 - a)gt-1(Z) 
gt  (1- 0:)gt-1(2) + (1- %(2t-1 +  21-1))(1- gt-1(2)) , 
and his defined as hT(z,(:J,p)  =  (uH,uL,C)  and for t < T 
(1- 8)uH + 8(%pr+1 + %Z41Pt+1 + (1 - %(1 +  Zf+1))P~1) 
ht(z, (:J, p)  =  (1 - 8)uL + 8(%zt+1pr+1 + (1 - %Zt+1)Pt+1) 
(1 - 8)c +  8(% (zf+1 (Pt+1  - pr+1) + (1 - Zf+1)(:Jt+1 (P~l - pf+1)) + pf+1) 
The function 9 gives the market composition that results when the sequence of trad-
ing  patterns is  given  by  2  and the initial  proportion of high-value  buyers  is  b!f. 
The function  h  gives  the reservation prices that result when the sequence of trad-
ing patterns, market compositions,  and reservation prices is  given by 2,  (:J,  and p, 
respectively.  We show that f  is  well defined, i.e., that for  each (z,/3,p;z,(:J,p)  E  D, 
f(z, /3, P; Z, (:J, p)  E K. 
Let (z, /3, P; Z, (:J,  p)  E  D.  We  show that f(z, /3, P; Z, (:J, p)  =  (2, jJ, p)  E  K. Clearly 
2 =  z E 't(z,  /3, p)  C  [0, 1j2CT+1). We prove by induction that 
tH  A  H  (1 - a) bo  ::;  /3t  ::; bo , 
for t E  {O, ... ,T}, therefore establishing that jJ  E  [Q, b!f]T+1.  (Note that for t ::;  T, 
(1- a)tb!J  2::  (1-alb!J = /1.)  Since ,130 = b!J,  assume that the claim holds at [2:: 0. 
vVe show that it holds at t + 1.  By the definition of 9 we have 
A  (1 - a)jJl 
/3l+1  =  A  a  L  SA' 
(1 - o:)/3l +  (1 - "2(Zt  + Zt  ))(1 - /3l) 
Since jJl+1  is increasing in both zt and zf, and zf ::;  1 and zf ::;  1,  we have 
A  (l-o:)jJl  A  H 
/3l+1  <  A  A  =  /3l < bo . 
- (1 - o:)/3l + (1 - 0:)(1 - /3l)  -
Also since zf 2: °  and zf 2:  0,  and °  < o:jJl < 1,  we have 
jJl+1  2::  (1 A- o:)jJl  A  =  (1 - o:)j3l  2::  (1 - o:)jJl2::  (1 - a)l+1bff. 
(1 - o:)/3l + (1 - /3l)  1 - a/3l 
Finally, we show that P E [0, l]3CT+1), and satisfies PT  = (uH,uL,C),  and for  t  < T, 
H  L  d  H  S  (  s:1-6T-tC1-a)T-t)(  H  )  B  h  d fi  f h  Pt  - Pt  2::  0,  an  Pt  - Pt  2::  1 - O:u  1-6(1-a)  U  - c.  Y tee nit  ion 0  , 
27 PT  =  (uH,uL,c).  We show that 0::; P;::;  1 for  t  E  {O, ... ,T} and T  E  {L,H,S}, 
and therefore that P  E  [0, Ij3(T+I).  Since (z, {3, p)  E  K, then pr+!  ::;  1,  pt+I  ::;  1,  and 
PEt-I  ::;  1,  and since in the expressions for  p~ and pf the coefficients on pr+I'  pt+! , 
and PEt-I  sum to one, we have 
p;  ::;  (1 - 8)u
T  + 8::; 1, 
for  T  E {H, L}. Rewriting the expression for pr as 
the same argument yields 
pf ::;  (1 - 8)c + 8 ::;  1. 
Also  (z, {3, p)  E  K  implies that pr+I  ~ 0,  pt+!  ~ 0,  and PEt-I  ~ 0,  and since the 
coefficients of these terms in the expressions for  p~, pf, and pf are nonnegative, we 
have p;  ~  0 for  T  E {H,L,S}. 
Now for t < T, we have 
p~ - pf =  (1  - 8)(uH - uL) + 8[~(1 - zt+!)(pr+! - pt+I) + (1 - ~(1 + Zr+I))(p~1 - pf+I)]· 
Since (1-8)(uH  - uL )  ~  0 and (1- zf+I) (pr+I - pf+!)  ~  0 (because zf+! < 1 implies, 
by the definition of  'Y~ that pt+!  ::; pr+I)' and PEt-I - pt+I  ~  0 (because (z, {3, p)  E K), 
h  AH  AL  > 0  we  ave Pt  - Pt  _  . 
Also for t < T,  we have 
p~ - pf  (1  - 8)(u
H 
- c) +  8[1 - ~(1 + Zf+l) - ~  (1  - Zf+!){3t+I)](P~l - pr+l) 
>  (1  - 8)(u
H 
- c) + 8(1 - a)(p~1 - pf+!). 
Since (z, {3, p)  E K, we have 
and therefore 
1 - 8T - t- I (1  - af-t- 1 
>  ((1- 8) + 8(1 - a)(l - a8  1 _  8(1 _ a)  ))(u
H 
- c) 
1 - 8T - t(1-af-t  H 
(1 - a8  8(  )  )(u  - c).  1- I-a 
28 Hence f  is  well defined,  and since both 9 and h are continuous functions, f  is  a 
continuous function.  Now let 'P  be given for  (z, (3, p)  E K  by 
'P(z, j3, p)  =  {f(z, j3, p; E, /3, p) I (E, /3, p)  E "((z, j3, pH· 
Clearly 'P  is an upper hemicontinuous closed valued correspondence.  Cellina's Theo-
rem therefore implies that 'P  has a fixed point. 
Let (z, j3, p)  be a fixed point of 'P.  We construct a market equilibrium (p, r, A)  as 
follows:  We  use  binary strings m  =  (mo, ... ,mT)  E {a, I}T+l  to index low-value 
buyers and sellers strategies.  For T E {B,L}  and m  =  (mo, ... ,mT)  E {a,I}T+l 
define 
T 
ATm  =  IT (z;)mt(1 - z;)l-mt , 
t=o 
and let MT  =  {m E {a, IV+l I  ATm  > a}.  Note that L:mEM"T ATm  =  1. 
HIGH-VALUE  BUYERS:  All  high-value  buyers  follow  the same strategy,  given  by 
rf =  pp  and pp = pr for t E  {a, ... ,T}. Hence AH =  1. 
LOW-VALUE  BUYERS:  Let x =  (xo, ... ,XT)  be an arbitrary vector of real numbers 
such that Xt  < pr for t  E  {a, ... ,T}. For m E  ML  define the low-value buyer strategy 
(pLm , rLm ) as rfm = pf and 
pr  ifmt=1 
otherwise, 
for t E  {a, ... ,T}. 




pp  otherwise, 
if mt =  I 
for t  E {a, ... ,T}. 
For  t  E  {a, ... ,T} and  T  E  {L,B},  define  M;  =  {m E  MT  I mt  =  I},  i.e., 
MF  (Mt
S )  contains the indexes corresponding to low-value buyer (seller)  strategies 
which offer sellers (low-value buyers) their reservation price at date t.  Straightforward 
29 calculations (which we omit) show that under the laws of motion given in Section 2.1, 
the strategy distribution (p, r, >.)  defined above satisfies 
mEM[ 
for each t  E  {O, ... ,T} and T  E {L, S}. In other words, at each date t the proportion 
of low-value buyers (sellers)  in the market who offer sellers  (low-value buyers) their 
reservation price is zf (4). 
We prove that (p, r, >.) is a market equilibrium.  Given (p, r, >'),  let bP be computed 
according to the laws of motion developed in Section 2.1.  We show by induction that 
bP  = (3t  for t  E  {O, ... ,T}.  Clearly bt!  = 90(z)  = (30'  Assume that bp  = 9[(Z)  = (3[ 
for f 2 0;  we show that bP-t-l  =  (3[+1'  By definition we have 
b!i  =  bp MP 
HI  b!i 1I!i +  bI: ~  >.!:m lI!:m . 
t  rt  t  L.JmEML  t  rt 
In this expression, MP  is given by 
For each m' E MS we have p!i  =  p§  =  r~ml  and  p~ml < r!i (because p~ml E {pI:  p!i}  t  tt'  t  - t  t  t't' 
and (z,!3,p)  E  K  implies pr  ::;  pP  = rf)·  Thus, I(pp,rfm/) = I(rf,pfm/) =  1 for 
each rn' E lv1s, and hence 
Also for Mfm  we have 
Note that for  each m' EMs, m[ = 1 implies I (pfm , rfm/) = 1,  and m[ = 0 implies 
I(pfm,rfm/) =  0;  also  I(rfm,pfm/) =  1 whenever m' E  Mf, and I(rfm,pfm/) =  0 
whenever m' t/:.  Mf· Therefore we have 
30 Substituting in the expression for  b?-t-l'  and noticing that bp  =  f3t  by the induction 
hypothesis, we get 
Since mt =  1 if m  E Mf and mt =  D if m  r/:.  Mf, we have 
mEMf 
Also as noted earlier LmEMT Ai"'  =  z[ for each T  E {L, S}.  Hence, the expression for 
t 
b?-t-l  simplifies to 
H  f3t(1- et) 
bt+1 =  f3  (  )  (  f3  )(  0<  L  0<  S)·  t  1 - et  +  1 - t  1 - "2Zt  - "2Zt 
Therefore b?-t-l  =  gt+ 1 (z)  =  f3 t+  1· 
Now we establish by induction that (p, r, A) satisfies Condition El for t  E  {D, ... ,T}. 
Since VT +1 =  D for  T  E {H,L,S}, the definition of h yields 
H  H  H  H  D  J;:T/"H  U  - rT  = u  - PT  =  = U VT+l' 
and 
L  L",  L  L  0  nTL 
U  - r T  = U  - PT =  = U v  T  +1 , 
S"'  S  0  nTS  rT  - C = PT  - C =  = U vT+l. 
Thus, El holds at T. 
Suppose that El is satisfied at t + 1 ::;  Tj we  show that it is satisfied at t,  i.e., 
uH  - rp =  0Vi-!I.  For high-value buyers we have 
mE MS  mEMS 
Since P?-t-l  =  P¥+1  =  rf.;!  for  each m  EMs, J(P?-t-l' rf;l)  =  1 for  each m  EMs. 
Therefore 
P
H  H  S 
t+l  =  U  - Pt+l· 
31 Also 
R~l  =  L  (UH - pf+1).f+1I(r~1,pf+1) + (1 - L  ).f+/(r~1,pf+1))8Vf~2· 
mEMs  mEMs 
Since Pf+1  =  pr+1  :s;  P~l =  r~l when mt+1  =  1,  and Pf+1  =  P~l =  r~l when 
mt+1  = 0,  we have I(r~1,pf+1) = 1 for each m E MS.  Thus 
RH  - t+1  -
mEMr+1  mEMS\Mr+l 
- u
H 
- (Zr+1pr+1 + (1 - Zr+1)p~l)· 
>From the definition of Vf~l in Section 2.2,  and as  8Vf~2 =  uH  - P~l by the 
induction hypothesis, we  have 
where the last equality holds  by the definition of h.  Therefore El holds  at t for 
T=H. 
\\le now establish that El holds at t for  each low-value buyer strategy m  E  AIL, 
i.e.) u
L 
- rfTn  =  811[:'1.  For m E ML) we have 
S·  LTn  - S  - STn' Ch'  E MS·f  - - 1  d  LTn  _  _  <  S  _  STn'  mce Pt+1  - Pt+1  - rt+1 lor eac  m  1  mt+1  - ,an  Pt+1  - Xt+1  Pt+1  - rt+1 
if mt+1  =  0,  and since  8Vf~2 =  uL - pr+1  by the induction hypothesis, we have 
We show that ptI can be written as 
P LTn  L  [L  S  (1  L) L  1  t+1  =  u  - Zt+1Pt+1 +  - Zt+1  Pt+1  . 
32 If  Zf+1  =  0, then mE+!  =  0,  and therefore 
PLm  _  L  L  _  L  [L  S  (1  L) L  1  E+1  - U  - PE+1  - u  - ZE+1PE+1 +  - ZE+1  PE+1  . 
If  zt+  1  =  1, then mE+ 1  =  1 and therefore 
PLm  L  S  L  [L  S  (1  L) L  1  E+!  = U  - PE+!  = U  - ZE+1PE+1 +  - ZE+!  PE+!  . 
If  zt+1  E (0,1), then P¥+1  = pt+1  by the definition of ,,(,  and hence 
PLm  L  [L  S  (1  L) L  1  E+!  =  U  - ZE+!PE+1 +  - ZE+1  PE+! 
whether mE+1  =  1 or mE+!  =  0. 
For m E  M L , we have 
RLm 
E+1  = 
m'EMf  m'EMf 
L  L 
- U  - PE+1' 
where the last equality holds since, by the induction hypothesis,  8Vf~2 =  u
L 
- pr+1' 
Summing up, we have 
where the last equality follows from the definition of h. Since mE ML was arbitrary, 
therefore El holds at t for  all m E M L . 
\;Ye show that El holds at f for each seller strategy m E MS, i.e., c - rfm  =  8Vf~i' 
For m E MS,  we have 
PSm 
E+1  = 
m'EML 
+(1 - b~1I(rY-t-l>pfB) - (1- b~1) L  Af;; I (r;;; ,pf';1))8Vf~2' 
m'EAfL 
33 Since pf::-1  = Pt+1  ~  PP-t-1  = rP-t-1  if mt+1  = 1,  and pf::-1  = PP-t-1  =  r~1 if mt+l = 0,  and 
since 8Vj-!'2  =  pr+l  - c by the induction hypothesis, we have 
S  {  Pt+1  - c  if mt+l  =  1 
Pt+l  =  f3t+l (PP-t-1  - c) + (1 - f3t+1)(pr+l  - c)  if mt+1 = 0, 
where we have replaced bP-t-1  with f3t+l' We show that P~l can be written as 
This clearly holds if either Zr+1  = °  (and hence mt+l  = 0)  or zr+l  =  1 (and hence 
mt+1 = 1). If  zr+1  E  (0,1) then f3t+l (PP-t-1  - pr+l) = Pt+l - pr+1  by the definition of ,,(, 
which is the same as Pt+1  =  f3t+1PP-t-1 + (1 - f3t+1)pr+l'  Hence 
P~l  - pt+1  - c =  f3t+1 (PP-t-1  - c) + (1 - f3t+1)(pr+1  - c) 
- Zr+1pt+1 + (1 - zf+l)(f3t+1PP-t-1 + (1 - f3t+l)p¥+l)  - c. 
For m  E  MS we have 
+  (1 - bP-t-1 I (PP-t-1 , rf;1) - (1 - bP-t-1)  L  >..f;; I (pf;; , rf;1) )  8V t!'2. 
m'EML 
U ·  th t  H  S  Sm  Lm'  S  Sm'f'  1  Lm'  S  smg  a  Pt+1  = Pt+1  = rt+1, Pt+l  = Pt+l  = rt+1 1  mt+l =  'Pt+1 = Xt+l  < Pt+l  = 
rf.::'1  if m[+1  = 0,  and 8Vr!'2  = pit! - c by the induction hypothesis we have 
RiB  =  f3t+1  (p¥+l  - c) + (1 - f3t+l)  L  >..f;; (P¥+1  - c) 
m'EMhl 
+(1 - f3t+l  - (1 - f3t+1)  L  >.f;;)(P¥+1 - c). 
m'EMhl 
H  RSTn  - S  ence  t+l  - Pt+l - c. 
Substituting these formulas into the expression for  Vj-!'1  and using that 8Vj-!'2  = 
pr+l  - c by the induction hypothesis, we have 
8Vj-!'1  8; (Pt~l + Rf;l) + (1 - a)8
2Vj-!'2 
8[; (zf+1Pt+l + (1 - Zr+l) (f3t+1 PP-t-1 + (1 - f3t+l)pr+l) + pr+1  - 2c) + (1 - a)(pr+l - c: 
- 8[%(zr+l(Pt+l - pr+l) + (1- zr+l)f3t+l(PP-t-l  - pr+l)) + pr+ll- Dc 
S  Pt  - c, 
34 where the last equality follows  from the definition of h.  Therefore El holds at [ for 
all m EMs. 
Finally we  show  that  (p, r, >.)  satisfies  E2  for  t  E  {O, ... ,T}. For  buyers,  E2 
requires that pr maximize 
(Note that for low value buyers P{(x) does not depend upon the particular low-value 
buyer strategy being followed,  since  V;~1 =  uL - pf by El, and so  we  write PP(x) 
instead of ~Lm(x).) Since rfm  =  pf for  m EMs, P{(x) is given by 
If x > pr, then p{(pf) > Pt(x), as 
If  pr > pr, then Pt(pf) > Pt(x) for x < pr, as 
PtT(pf) = UT  - pf > UT  - pr = Pt(x). 
If pr  =  pr, then Pt(pr) =  Pt(x) > Pt(x') for x < pr < x', as 
Finally, if pr < P(,  then Pt  (x)  > P{(X') for  x < pr  :::;  x', as 
For high-value buyers we have pr ~  pr and therefore pr =  pr maximizes PtH(x). 
For low-value  buyers,  let m  E  ML  be arbitrary.  If zf =  1,  then pf  ~ pf by the 
definition of 'Y  and so pfm  =  pr maximizes ptL  (x).  If °  < zf < 1, then pf =  pr  and 
therefore pfm  = pr  (if mt = 1)  and pfm = Xt  < pr are both maximizers of PtL(x).  If 
zf =  0, then pf :::; pr and therefore pfm  =  Xt  < pr maximizes PP(x). 
Finally, we show that sellers strategies satisfy E2. Let m  E  MS.  We  must show 
that for  each t  E {a, ... ,T}, pfm  maximizes 
m'El'vlL 
+(1 - bJI I(rJI, x) + (1 - bJI)  L  >.~m'  I(r~m', x))8V;!i. 
m'EML 
35 As shown earlier, br = f3t.  Since rf = pr, rfm
l  = pf for each m' E  M L ,  and since 
8~!1 =  pf - c by El, this expression reduces to 
Note that for x < pf, since pf ~ pr we have 
Also note that since pf ~ pr, then for x > pr, we have 
Finally, for pf < x < pr, we have 
Thus for  arbitrary x,  ~Sm(x) ~  max{ptSm(pf), ~Sm(pr)}. 
If zf =  1, then 0 < (pr - pf)f3t  ~  pf - pf and therefore 
PSm(  H)  _  S  (H  S)f3  <  S  L  S _  pSm(  L) 
t  Pt  - Pt  - C +  Pt  - Pt  t  - Pt  - c +  Pt  - Pt  - t  Pt· 
Hence pfm  = pf maximizes ptSm(x).  If  0 < zf < 1 then 0 < (pfI -l/)f3t = pf - pf 
and therefore 
PSm (  H)  _  S  (H  s)f3  _  L  _  pSm (  L) 
t  Pt  - Pt  - c +  Pt  - Pt  t  - Pt  - C  - t  Pt· 
Hence both pfm  = pf (if mt =  1)  and pfm  = pr (if mt = 0)  maximize ptm(x).  If 
zf =  0, then (pr - pf)f3t  ~  pf - pf and therefore 
PSm(  H)  _  S  (H  S)f3  >  S  L  S _  pSm(  L) 
t  Pt  - Pt  - C +  Pt  - Pt  t  - Pt  - C +  Pt  - Pt  - t  Pt· 
Hence pfm  =  pr maximizes ptSm (x).  D 
7  Appendix B: Proofs of propositions 1 to 4 
Before proving propositions 1 to 4,  we establish a number of lemmas.  Throughout 
assume that (p, r,.\) is a market equilibrium. 
36 Lemma 1 establishes that in a market equilibrium all type T  traders have identical 
reservation prices and expected utilities. 
Lemma 1. For each  T  E {H, L, S}, each  k, k'  E {I, ... ,nT} and each t  =  0, ... ,T : 
(L1.1) r? = r;k', 
(L1.2)  R?  =  R?', 
(L1.3)  prk =  pt
Tk', and 
(L1.4)  YtTk  =  YtTk'. 
Proof:  We  show  that if  Vl~.\  =  Vl;~ for  T  E  {H,L,S}, and k,k' E  {I, ... ,nT}, 
then L1.1  - L1.4  hold at t.  This establishes the Lemma as  V;~l =  V;!'l  =  0 for 
T  E {H,L,S}, and k,k' E {I, ... ,nT}. 
Assume that Vl;l  =  Vl;~ for  T  E  {H,L,S}, and k,k'  E  {I, ... ,nT};  then for 
T  E B, E.1 implies 
For T  =  S, E.1. implies 
Hence L 1.1  holds at f. 
S·  Tk  - Tk'  d T7Tk - T/Tk'  th  RTk  - RTk'  d th  £  L1 2 h  Id  t  t- mce r[  - r[  an  ~f+l - Vf+l'  en  [  - [  ,an  ere ore  .  0  sa. 
F  B  T/To  VTo,  d  Sj  Sj'.  1·  pTO  pTo,.  h··  h  Or  T  E  ,vl~I =  l~l an  rl  =  r l  Imp les  l' =  l"  smce ot  erwlse elt  er 
p?  or p?,  does  not satisfy E.2.  An analogous argument shows  P(j  =  ptj';  hence 
L1.3 holds at f.  Finally, trader Tk'S expected utility at t is 
Since L1.2 and L1.3 hold at t,  and since Vl;l =  Vl;~, L1.4 holds at t.  0 
Hereafter we write r[, R[, Pt, and YtT  for  the equilibrium reservation prices and 
expected utilities of a trader of type T  E {H, L, S} at time t  ~  T. Also we denote by 
Pt  (x)  the expected utility of a buyer of type T  who is matched and proposes a price 
of x at date t  and follows  his equilibrium strategy thereafter, i.e., 
pr(x) =  (UT  - x)I(x,rf) + (1- I(x,rf))8Yt~1. 
37 Analogously,  we  denote by R[  (x)  the expected utility of a  buyer of type T  who is 
matched,  employs  a  reservation  price of x  at date t,  and follows  his  equilibrium 
strategy thereafter, i.e., 
nS  nS 
R;(x) =  2)u
T 
- p~j)  ..  ~j  I(x,p~j) + (1- L)..~j  I(x,p~j))8~:1' 
j=l  j=l 
Neither P{(x) nor R[(x) depend on which equilibrium strategy a type T  buyer might 
be playing since by Lemma 1 buyers of the same type have identical continuation 
payoff ~~1' 
For  sellers,  we  denote by  pl(x) the expected utility of a  matched seller  who 
proposes a price of x  at date t  and follows  his equilibrium strategy thereafter, i.e., 
TEB  TEB 
Analogously,  we  denote by Rf (x)  denote the expected  utility of a  matched seller 
who employs a reservation price of x  at date t  and follows  his equilibrium strategy 
thereafter, i.e., 
TEB  i=l  TEB  i=l 
Condition E.2  can be written as p?  E  argma.xx P{(x)  for  T  E  {H, L, S} and 
k  :S  n
T
•5  Further, if r[  satisfies E.1, then for  any x  we  have R[(r[)  ~ R[(x); i.e., 
r[  E argmaxx R[(x).  This follows  from r[  =  UT  - 8~~1' as  R[(r[) - R[(x) can be 
written as 
i=l 
which is always non-negative since I(r[,p~j) - I(x,p~j) > 0 implies r[ - p~j > 0,  and 
I(r[,p~j) - I(x,p~j) < 0 implies r[ - p~j < O. 
Lemma 2 characterizes buyers' optimal price offers. 
5Note  that the sequences  P?}i=o  for  T  E  {H,L,S}  and  k  E  {l, ... ,nr },  and {bni=o  for 
T  E {H, L} are unaffected by a single trader offering a price different from his equilibrium offer. 
38 Lemma 2. For each  T  E B, each i  ::; n
T  and each t =  0, .. , ,T : 
(L2.1) p;i  ::; rf, and 
(L2.2) r[ > rf implies p;i  =  rf, and 
(L2.3) r[ < rf implies p;i  < rf. 
Proof:  Let  T  E  B, i  ::;  n  T  and t  E  {O,... ,T}.  We  prove  L2.1.  Suppose that 
p;i  ;:::  rf.  Condition E.2 implies that Pt(p;i)  ;:::  Pt(x) for  x  ;:::  O.  In particular, 
Pt(p;i) ;:::  Pt(rf), i.e., 
h  To  <  S  Th  To  >  s,  l'  To  s·  Ti  <  S  Th  £  L2 1 h  Id  ence Pt'  _  rt .  us Pt'  _  rt  Imp Ies Pt'  =  rt ; I.e., Pt  _  rt .  ere ore  .  0  s 
We prove L2.2.  Suppose p;i  =I  rf; then L2.1 implies p;i  < rf. By E.2 we have 
T  T  £TTT  PTO(  TO)  > PTO(  S)  T  S 
U  - rt  = U Vt+I  =  t' Pt'  _  t' rt  = u  - rt , 
which yields r[ ::; rf. 
Finally, we  prove L2.3.  Suppose p;i  ;:::  rf; then L2.1 implies p;i  =  rf.  Let x  be 
such that rf > x  ;:::  O.  By E.2 we have 
T  S  PT(  Ti)  > PT()  T  T  U  - rt  =  t  Pt  _  t  X  = u  - rt , 
, . b'  l'  T>  S  n  wmc 1  llnp IeS  Tt  _  r t .  LJ 
For each t such that rf - rf > 0,  we write 1ft  for the ratio (rf - rf)j(rf - rf). 
Lemma 3 characterizes sellers' optimal offers. 
Lemma 3. For each  j  ::; nS and each t =  0, ... ,T, if rf > max{rf, rf} then 
(L3 1)  Sj  {L  H}  .  Pt  E  rt , rt  , 
(L3.2)  bP < 1ft  implies  p~j =  rf, 
(L3.3)  bP = 1ft  implies Pl(rf) = ptS(rf), and 
(L3.4)  bP > 1ft  implies  p~j =  rf. 
Proof:  Let  j  ::;  nS  and t  ::;  T,  and assume that rp > max{rf, rf}.  We  establish 
L3.1. 
39 S  L  H  S.)  L  S)  Ifp/ :S rt , then I(rt  ,Pt]  = I(rt ,Pt]  = 1.  By E.2 we have 
S·  S(  s)  S(  L)  L  Pt]  - c = Pt  Pt J  ;:::  Pt  rt  = rt  - c, 
and therefore p~j =  rf. 
If  L  s·  H  h  rt  < Pt]  :S rt ,t en 
As bf > 0 (because bff  E (0,1) and et < 1), it follows that  p~j ;::: rf. Hence p~j =  rf. 
We  show that p~j  :S  rf, which establishes L3.1.  Suppose  p~j > rf; then E.2 
implies 
i.e., rf;::: rf· This contradicts rf > max{rf,rf}, and proves p~j :S rf. 
Now we prove L3.2 - L3.4.  If rf > rf, then'Trt > O.  Since rf > rf, the definitions 
of pt
S (x) and 'Tr t  yield 
ptS(r{f) = b{f (rf - c) + (1 -bf)(rf - c)  = (;: - 1) (rf - rf) + pts(rf)· 
If bfI  <  'Trt,  then Pl(rf)  <  Pl(rf) and therefore  p~j  =  rf·  If bfI  =  'Trt,  then 
ptS(rf) = pp(rf)· Finally, ifbf > 7rt, then Pt  (rf) > Pt(rf) and thereforep~j = rf· 
If rf :S  rf, then 7rt  :S  0 and therefore bf > 'Trt·  We must show that p~j =  rf· 
Since bfI  > 0 and rf > rf ~  rf, we have bf  rf + (1 - bfI)rf > rf, and therefore 
S  H  hence Pt]  =  rt  .  0 
Lemmas 4 and 5 establish some inequalities between reservation prices and be-
tween expected utilities for the different types of traders. 
Lemma 4. For each t =  0, ... ,T : 
(L4.1) rf > rf, and 
(L4.2)  ~H  _  ~L < uH  _  uL . 
40 Proof:  We  establish Lemma 4  by induction.  As  V~l =  V;+l  =  0,  E.1 implies 
rT =  UT  for  7  E  B;  hence r,f!  = uH  > uL  =  r~, and therefore L4.1 holds for t = T. 
Also as rf =  c,  we  have r!J.  >  max{r~,rf}, and L3.1 implies Pf E  {r!J.,r~}; hence 
vI! ::;  ~(uH - c) + ~(uH  - uL), and V;  =  ~(uL - c). Thus, as 0: < 1 we get 
and therefore L4.2 holds for t  =  T. 
Assume that L4.1  and L4.2 hold for  t  =  k + 1 ::; T.  We show that they hold for 
t = k.  By E.1 we have r'k  =  UT  - 8V{+l'  and therefore 
where the strict inequality follow from the induction hypothesis.  Thus L4.1 holds for 
t  =  k. 
We  show that vt - Vk
L  <  uH - uL .  Let i  ::;  nH.  Since  Pf:  >  Pf:(p-J:i)  and 
Rf 2:  Rf(r-J:i)  by El and E2, respectively, we have 
Also the induction hypothesis yields 
P
H  pL{~H;\ 
k  - k  \1'k  J  J(p-J:;, rZ)( uH - u
L
) + (1 - J(p-J:i, re) )8(vl!1 - vl+1) 
<  uH  _  uL , 
and 
j=l  j=l 
Therefore 
vt  - Vk
L  <  ~(PkH - pf(pfi) + R-J: - Rf(rfi)) + (1 - 0:)8(Vk!1 - Vk~l) 
<  u H  _uL . 
Hence L4.2 holds for t =  k.  0 
41 Lemma 5.  For each t =  0, ... ,T : 
(L5.1) rf > rf, and 
(  ) 
H  liS  (H  ) 1_8T- t+1(1_0)T-t+1 
L5.2  ~ + v t  ~  Q  U  - C  1-8(1-0)  . 
Proof:  First we show that rf > rf implies pt
H + Rf ~  uH  - c.  Suppose that rf > 
rf; then p~i =  rf for  each i  ~  nH  by L2.2. Thus 
and 
(p~i - c)I(p~i, rf) + (1 - I(p~i, rf))(rf - c)  =  rf - c. 
Since pfi ::; rf for i  ::; nL  by L2.1, we have 
(pfi - c)I(pfi, rf) + (1 - I(pfi, rf))(rf - c)  =  rf - c. 
Hence 
TEE  i=l  TEE  i=l 
and therefore ~H  + Rf = uH  - rf + rf - c = uH  - c. 
Next we  establish that rf > rf implies Rf + pt
S  ::; uH  - c.  Suppose rf > rf; 
since rf > rf by L4.1, then rf > max{rf, rf} and therefore p~j E {rf, rf} by L3.1. 
If p;j  =  rf, then L3.4 implies bf ::;  7rt, and since bf > 0,  we  have rf - rf > 0 and 
£  S  S  If  S  H  h  H  S  I  h  s·  S  Th  H  S  there ore Pt]  > rt ·  Pt]  =  rt  ~  t  en as rt  > rt  we a so  ave Pt]  > rt .  us rt  > rt 
implies  I(rf,p~j) ~  I(rf,p~j) for j  ::; nS, and therefore we have 
( H  s·  s.)  (H  s·  (S  )  (L  s.)  S  )  (  (L  s.))(  S  )  I  rt ,p/  )(p/ - c  + (1  - I  rt ,p/)) rt  - c  2::  I  rt ,p/ (p/ - c  +  1 - I  rt  ,Pt]  rt  - c ; 
( 




Summing up we obtain RfI + pt :::; uH  - c. 
We  establish Lemma 5 by induction.  Since  V;~1 = 0,  E.1  implies r¥  = uH  > 
C  =  rf,  and therefore  L5.1  holds  for  t  =  T.  Moreover,  since r¥  > rf,  we  have 
pf! + Rf  :::;  uH  - c,  and R¥ + Pf.  :::;  uH  - c.  Hence, since a < 1, for t =  T we have 
a  1 - 8T-t+l(1 - a)T-t+l 
V;S + V;H = _(pS +  R S + pH + RH) < a(uH  - c) = a(uH  - c)-------'-----
T  T  2  T  T  T  T  - 1 - 8(1 - a) 
Therefore L5.2 holds for  t  =  T. 
H  S  H  S  H  1_6T- k(I_0:)T-k 
Assume that rH1 > rH1, and Vk+1 +  VH1  :::;  a(u  -c)  1-6(1-0:)  for k+  1 :::; T. 
H  S  H  S  H  1_6T- k+1(1_0:)T-k+l  . 
We show that rk  > rk  and Vk  +  Vk  < a(u  - c)  1-6(1-0:)  .  Smce 8> °  and 
1 ·  1·  1_6T
-k+
1(1_0:)T-k+l  1  th  .  d  t·  h  th·  . Id  v,H  V,S  a <  Imp Ies a  1-6(1-0:)  <,  e m  uc  IOn  ypo  eSIs  YIe  s  k+1 +  HI < 
uH  - c,  and therefore E.1 yields 
Hence rt: > r~, and therefore PI! +  R~  :::;  uH  - c,  and Rt: + pt :::; uH  - c.  Thus 
which establishes the lemma.  0 
Lemma 6 establishes a number of basic results that are frequently used in subse-
quent arguments. 
Lemma 6. For each t  =  0, ... ,T : 
(L6 1) pHi =  rS  'or each i < nH .  .  tt,  JI  _, 
(L6.2)  J.L~i = 1 - a, for each i  :::;  nH ; 
(L6.3)  pt
H  =  uH  - rf; 
43 (L6.4)  Rf =  UL  - rf; 
(L6.5)  Rf =  rf - c. 
Proof:  L6.1 is  a direct implication of L2.2 and L5.1.  In order to prove L6.2, note 
that L6.1  implies  I(p~i,rf) =  1 for  each j  ~ nH, and since rp > max{rf,rf} by 
L4.1 and L5.1, we have rf :s:  pfi  :s:  rp, and therefore I (rp, pfi) =  1 for each j  :s:  n S 
by L3.1. Hence 
Also  note that  again rf  ~ pfi  for  each  j  ~ nS  implies  I(rf,pfi)(uL - pfi) 
I (rf  ,pfi  )  (uL - rf), and therefore using E.1 we have 
j=l  j=l 
which establishes L6.4. 
Finally, since p;i  ::; rf by L2.1, we have J(p;i, rf)(p;i - c)  =  J(p;i, rf)(rf - c)  for 
each T  E Band i  :s:  n  T.  Hence E.1 implies 
Rs - "'bT"'( Ti  )\TiJ(  Ti  s) + (1  "'bT'"  \TiJ(  Ti  s))(  S  ) _  S  t  - ~  t  ~  P  - C  At  Pt, r t  - ~  t  ~  At  Pt, r t  rt  - c  - rt  - c, 
TEB  i=l  TEB  i=l 
"\vhich establishes L6.5.  0 
Since in a market equilibrium all high-value buyers follow  the same strategy by 
L1.1  and L6.1,  henceforth  we  refer  to the high-value  buyer  strategy as  (pH, rH). 
Lemma 7 establishes that the proportion of high-value buyers in the market does not 
increase over time. 
Lemma 7.  The sequence  {bP} ~:al is non-increasing. 
Proof:  For t E {O, ... ,T}, b~l is given by 
(1  )bH  bL  ~nL \Li  Li'  - a  t  +  t  L....i=l At  J-lt 
44 
,I where we have used the fact that J.L{!i  = 1 - Q  by L6.2. Since 
for each i  ::; nL , we have 
H  (1 - Q)b[I  H 
bt+1  ::;  (1 _ Q)b[I + (1  _ Q)bf  =  bt .  0 
In lemmas 8 to 12 we for the low cost case which have implications for the dynamics 
of trading patterns.  Lemma 8 relates 1['t  and 1['*  when sellers offer the low-value-buyer 
reservation price. 
Lemma 8. Assume that uH  > uL > c. 
(L8.1)  If p~j = rf for each j  ::; nS and  1['t = 1['*,  then  1['t-l = 1['*. 
(L8.2)  If p~j =  rf for each  j  ::; nS and  1['t  < 1['*,  then  1['t-l < 1['*. 
Proof:  Suppose that p~j =  rf for  each j  ::;  nS.  By E.1,  the reservation price of a 
buyer of type T  E B  at t - 1 is 
T  T  8rQ/DT.  RT)  '(1  )( TT)]  rt- 1 =U  - l2~rt --r  t  "t'  - Q  U  - rt  . 
Also the reservation price of a seller at t - 1 is 
rf-l =  c +  8[~(PtS + Rf) + (1 - Q)(rf - c)]. 
Since p~j = rf for each j  ::; nS we have Pts = rf - c and R[I = uH  - rf. Furthermore, 
since pl;::: Pl(rf) =  rf -c  by E.2, we have rf ;:::  rf; hence Pl =  uL-rf. (If rf > rf, 
then L2 1 implies pLi  = rS for every i < nL  and therefore p'L = uL - rS' if rL = rS 
.  t  t  - ,  t  t,  t  t, 
then pfi ::; rf for every i  ::; nL by L2.2, and we have also  ~L  =  uL - rf =  uL - rf.) 
Substituting Pt and R[ from above and noticing L6.3 - L6.5 yields for  T  E B, 
r;_l - rf-l =  (1 - 8)(u
T 
- c) + 8(1 - Q)(r; - rf). 
45 S·  L  * (H  )  d  L  S - (H  S)  h  mce u  - c =  7f  U  - C  an  rt  - rt  - 7ft  rt  - rt  we  ave 
7ft-I  = 
(1 - 8)(uL  - c) +  8(1 - a)(rf - rf) 
(1 - 8)(uH  - c) + 8(1 - a)(rfi - rf) 
* (1 - 8)(uH  - c) + 8(1 - a)~(rfI - rf) 
7f 
(1 - 8)(uH  - c) + 8(1 - a)(rfi - rf) 
Thus, if 7ft = 7f* then 7ft-I = 7f*; hence L8.1 holds.  If 7ft < 7f*, then since rfI > rf by 
L5.1,  we have 7ft-I < 7f*; hence L8.2 holds.  D 
Lemma 9  establishes  a  dynamic relation between the proportion of high-value 
buyers in the market and ratio 7ft. 
Lemma 9. Assume that uH  > uL  > c. 
(L9.1)  If bfi  ~  7f*  ~  7ft, then  7f*  ~  7ft-I. 
(L9.2)  If bfI > 7f*  ~  7ft, then  7f* > 7ft-I. 
(L9.3)  If bfi  ~  7f*  ~  7ft  and  p~j =  rfi for some  j  ::; nS,  then  7f*  > 7ft-I. 
Proof:  Suppose that bfI  ~  7f*  2:  7ft. L3.3,  L3.4 and L4.1  imply 
Since Rf =  rf - c by L6.5, using E.1 we have 
a 
c + 8["2(bfI (rf - c) + (1 - bf)(rf - c) + rf - c) + (1 - a)(rf - c)] 
(1  - 8) c +  8[~bf  (rf - rf) + rf]· 
Let a E  [0, 1]  denote the proportion of sellers (out of the total measure of sellers 
in the market at date t)  who offer rfi at date t.  Then by L3.1  a proportion 1 - a of 
sellers offer rf. Thus, RfI =  uH  - arfI - (1-a)rf, and since pt
H  =  uH -".f by L6.4, 
E.1  yields 
r~I  u
H 
- 8[~  (u
H 
- arf - (1 - a)rf) + ~  (u
H 





- (1 - 8)u
H  + 8{ "2[rf + arf + (1  - a)rf] + (1  - a)rf}· 
r~I - rf-I  - (1  - 8)(u
H 
- c) + 8(1 - ~)(rf - rf) 
-8~  [bf (rf - rf) + (1 - a)(rf - rf)]· 
46 Note that if a < 1, then bfI  :::;  7ft by L3.4, and since bfI  ?:  7f*  ?:  7ft we have bfI = 7f* = 
7f t. Hence  b~  (r~ - rt) =  rf - rf, and therefore 
b~  (r~ - rf) + (1 - a)(r~ - rf) =  r~ - rf - a(r~ - rf)· 
Since Rf = uL - rf by L6.4, and I(pfi,rf)(uL - pfi)  =  I(pfi,rf)(uL - rt} for 
i  :::;  nL by Lemma 2,  E.1  yields 
rf-I  - uL - 8{~[I(pfi, rf)(uL - rf) + (1 - I(pfi, rf))(uL - rf) + (uL - rf)] 
+ (1 - a) (u
L 
- rf)} 
L  [a  (Li  s)(  L  s)  L]  (1 - 8) u  - 82
1 Pt  ,rt  rt  - rt  - rt  . 
Hence 
Suppose that pfi =  rf for  every i  ::; nL; then 
rf-I - rf-I =  (1- 8) (uL - c) + 8(1- ~)(rf - rf) - 8~b~(r~ - rf). 
Noticing that uL - c =  7f*(uL - c)  and rf - rf =  7ft(rf - rf), we have 
7f t-I =  7f  (  )  S  .  (1  - J:\ (.,H _,,\ -L"  1  _  £  ('l"H - 'l"S) - f.'£rbH(rH  - r  ) + (1 - a)(rH _ rL)l  ,.  c.:1'~  ~/'V~  2·t  't  U 2l t  t  t  t  tJ 
If  a =  1, then since 7ft  :::;  7f* < 1, we have 7ft-1 < 7f*.  Note that b~ > 7f*  ;::::  7ft implies 
a =  1 by L3.4, and therefore the conclusion of L9.2 holds. If a < 1,  then as shown 
above bfI (rf - rf) + (1 - a)(rf - rt) =  rf - rf - a(rf - rf), and therefore 
*  (1 - 8) (uH - c) + 8 (1 - a) ;;  (rf - rf) 
7ft-1 =  7f  (1 _ 8) (uH - c) + 8 (1 - a) (rf - rf) + 81a(rf - rt)· 
Since  7f*  ;::::  7ft  and rf - rf > °  by L4.1, we  have  7f*  ?:  7ft-I. Hence the conclusion 
of L9.1  holds.  Moreover,  if there is  j  :::;  nS  such that p~j  =  rf, then a >  0,  and 
since 8 > 0,  we  have  7f*  > 7ft-I; therefore the conclusion of L9.3 holds.  Hence the 
conclusions of L9.1, L9.2 and L9.3 hold when pfi =  rf for every i  :::; nL. 
47 for  T  E {L, S}, and V~l  ~  Vk~l by the induction hypothesis. 
For j  ~  nS  we have 
TEB  TEB 
(rt - c) + L b,J(rLp~j)(p~j - rt)· 
TEB 
Hence 
Thus, since R~  =  r~ - c by L6.5, we have 
nS 
pt + R~  =  2(r~ - c) + L  A~j L  b~J(rt,p~j)(p~j - rn· 
j=l  TEB 
For i  ~  nL  we have 
pt  J(p;i, r~)(uL - p;i) + (1 - J(p;i, r~))(uL - rt) 
- (uL - rt) + J(p;i, r~)(rt - P;~l), 
where the last equality follows again from Lemma 2.  Hence 
Pt =  (uL - rt) + L A;iJ(p;i, rt)(rt - rt)· 
i=l 
Thus, since Rt =  uL - rt by L6.4, we have 
n L 
pt + Rt =  2(uL - rt) +  LA;iJ(p;i,r~)(rt - r~). 
i=l 
Suppose that p~j =  rt: for each j  ~  nS. Then we have must show 
n L 
2(rt - c) + b;; (rf: - rt) ~  2(uL - rt) + (rt - r~) L  AtiJ(pti, rt), 
i=l 
which can be written using E.1 as 
nL 
28(Vf+1 - Vk~l) ~ (rt - rt) L  Ati J(pti, rt) - b;; (r;; - rt) 
i=l 
50 Since Vt+l  ~  Vk~l by the induction hypothesis and rt: > r~ by L5.1, this inequality 
holds if rf ::;  r~. If rf > r~, then since 0 ::;  E7~1 Ati I (pti ,rn ::;  1, it suffices to show 
I.e., 
7rk  - b;;_l  ::; 0, 
which holds as p;i  =  rt: implies bt:  ~  7rk by L3.2 and L3.3. 
Suppose that p;i  =  rf, for some j  ::; nS. Then 
pt + Rf = (rt - rf) + 2(rf - c). 
Also  7rk  ~ bt:  > 0 by  L3.2,  and since rt:  > rf  by  L4.1,  we  have rf  > rf. Thus 
pti = rf for  each i  ::; nL  by L2.1, and therefore 
Hence we must show 
I.e .. 
(rt - c) - (u
L 
- rf) ~  0; 
I.e., 
which holds by the induction hypothesis.  0 
Lemma 12  establishes that if at some date there are no gains to trade between 
low-value buyers and sellers, then there are no gains to trade at prior dates. 
Lemma 12:  Assume that uH  > uL  >  c.  There  is  c(a, T)  >  0  such  that if (j  E 
[1  - c(a, T), 1],  then rf - rf ::; 0 implies rf-! - rf-l < O. 
51 Proof: Assume rf - rf ::; 0;  Lemma 2 implies I(pfi, rf)(uL  - pfi) =  I(pfi, rf)(uL -
rf), therefore E.1 implies 
Since Rf =  uL  - rf by L6.4,  we have 
Thus, using E.1 we have 
For sellers,  since r[I - rf > 0 by L5.1  and rf - rf ::;  0,  we  have Kt  ::;  0 <  b[I. 
Thus, p~j =  r[I  > rf for every j  ::; nS  by L3.4,  and E.1 implies 
pt =  b[I (rfI - c) + (1 - b[I)(rf - c). 
Since Rf =  rf - c by L6.5, we have 
aSS  S  "2 (Pt  + Rt ) + (1 - a)8~+1 
~(b[I  (rfI - c) + (1 - b[I)(rf - c) + rf - c) + (1 - a)(rf - c). 
(rf - c) + ~bf(rf - rf), 
Thus, again by E.1 
rf-l = c +  8~s = (1 - 8)c + 8rf +  8~  bf  (rfI - rf). 
Therefore, 
rf-l - rf-l =  (1- 8)(u
L 
- c) + 8(rf - rf) - 8~bf(rfI - rf)· 
Since rf - rf ::; 0,  in order to prove rf-l - rf-l < 0, it suffices to show 
Using E.1, this inequality can be written as 
a8  H[  H  H  S  L  2 bt  (u  - c) - 8(~+1 +  ~+l)] >  (1 - 8)(u  - c). 
52 Since  bP  > 7rt,  L10.1 implies bP  ~ 7r*.  (For if bP  <  7r*,  then 7r*  =  7rt  <  bP,  a 
contradiction.)  Thus by L5.2 we have 
0'.8  1 - 8T- t+l(1 - a)T-t+l 
-7r*(uH  - c)[l - 80'.  ] 
2  1 - 6(1 - a) 
>  0'.8 (uL  _  c)[l _ 80'. 1 - 8
T
+l(1 - af +
I
]. 
2  1 - 8(1 - a) 
Thus, since uL  - c > 0, the inequality rf-I - rf-I < 0 holds whenever 
0'.8  1 - 8T+I (1  - af+l 
'ljJ(a, T, 6)  =  2(1 - 80'.  1-8(1 _ a)  ) - 1 + 6> O. 
Note that given a  E  (0,1) and T, 'ljJ(a, T, 8) is continuous on 8 E [0,1]. Also 'ljJ(a, T, 1) > 
O.  Hence there is E(a, T) > 0 such that for 6 E [1-E(a, T), 1]  we have 'ljJ(a, T, 6)  > 0, 
and therefore rf-I - rf-I < O.  0 
We are now ready to prove propositions 1 to 4. 
Proof of Proposition 1:  P1.1.1 holds by L1.1. We establish P1.1.2 by induction. 
At date T  we  have r¥ = u
H  >  rf = C >  r¥ = u
L
.  Assume that rt:+1  >  r~+1 ~  c > 
rt+1 = u
L for k+  1 ::; T; we show that rt: >  r~ ~ c> rt = u
L
. As rt:+1  >  r~+1 >  rt+I' 
L2.1 and L2.3 imply Pt:+1  =  r~+l > Pt+I' Also 7rk+1  < 0 < bt:+1  implies P;~I = rf-t1 
for each j  ::; nS  by L3.4. Thus, using El we calculate the buyer reservation prices at 
date k  as 
and 
The seller reservation price at date k is given by 
S·  H  d  H  S  h  mce u  > c an  rk+l > r k+l , we  ave 
53 Hence T{!  > Tf 2::  C > Tf =  uL . 
Now,  Pl.1.3 is implied by Pl.1.2, L2.1, L2.3, and L3.4.  In order to prove Pl.1.4, 
note that Pl.1.3 yields for i  ::; nL 
and since  f-L~i =  1 - a  for i  ::; nH  by L6.2, we have 
bH  "n
H 
)..Hi  Hi 
t-l wi=l  t-If-Lt-l  b~  = 
bH  "n
H 
)..Hi  Hi  bL  "n
L 
)..Li  Li 
t-l wi=l  t-If-Lt-l + t-l wi=l  t-lf-Lt-l 
(1- a)b~l  H 
(1 - a)bH  + 1 _ bH  < bt-l· 
t-l  t-l 
We  prove P1.2.1  and P1.2.2.  All transactions are at either the high-value-buyer 
or the seller reservation price.  These prices are determined, for  t < T, by the system 
of difference equations 
where rfJ  =  u
H  and rf =  c.  Thus, since 1 - I(l + b{!)  ::;  1 - I for each k, we have 
Also from above we have for each t 
bH  =  (1 - a)b~l  _  (1 - a)tb/f 
t  (1 - a)b~l + 1 - b~l  1 - [1  - (1 - a)t]b/f· 
Then, since  2:r:::~ 8
k <  1~6'  l-[l-CLa)kjbb"  <  l_lbb" ,  and since (1  - a)k < (1 - I)k for 
k > 0,  we have 
Tf  - (1 - 8)c +  8[Tf+l + ~b~l  (T~l - rf+1)] 
T 
C + ~ L  8
k
- tb{! (T{!  - r~) 
k=t+l 
a  H  bff  ) 
<  c + "2(u  - c) (1  _ bff)[l _ 8(1 _  I)]1](8, T  , 
54 where 
",(8, T)  -
Since limT->oo(T - t)(l - %f =  0,  we have 
lim lim ",(8, T) = lim  lim ",(8, T) = o. 
T->oo 8->1  8->1 T->oo 
Hence, since rf ~ c,  we have limT->oo lim8->1 rf = lim8->llimT->oo rf = c.  Therefore, 
P1.2.1 holds. 
Also, from above, we have 
holds.  0 
Proof of Proposition 2:  Some of the properties listed in Proposition 2 are direct 
implications of the previous lemmas:  P2.1.1 has been established in Lemma 1 (L1.1); 
P2.1.2  is  implied by L4.1  and L5.1; P2.2 is  L6.1;  P2.3.1  is  implied by Lemma 2; 
P2.4.1 is implied by P2.1.2 and L3.1. 
¥le prove P2.3.2.  By Lemma 12 there is c(a, T) >  0 such that if 8> 1 - E(a, T), 
then rf ::; rf implies rf-l < rf-l. Suppose that 8 E  [1  - c(a, T), 1].  If pti < rf for 
some i  ::;  nL ,  then L2.1 implies rf ::;  rf;  hence then rf-l < rf_l'  and by induction 
rf < rf for t < t; therefore L2.3 implies pfi < rf for every t < t and i  ::; nL . Now let 
t and i  ::;  nL  be such that pti = rf, suppose by way of contradiction that p~;' = rf 
for  some if  ::;  nL ,  and p~;'1  < rf for  some i"  ::;  nL  and i > t;  then the previous 
argument implies pfi < rf for every t < i and i ::; nL ; in particular, p~;' < rf, which 
is a contradiction. 
We  now  prove P2.4.2.  Assume that pi
j  =  rf for  some j  ::;  nS.  Then we  have 
bp ::;  7r*, for if bp > 7r*  then bp > 7rt by LlO.3, and therefore we would have p;j  =  rp 
for each j  ::; nS  by L3.4 and P2.1.2, which is a contradiction.  Suppose that bp < 7r*; 
55 then LlD.1  implies bP  < 7rt  for  each t  ;:::  t,  and therefore p;i  =  rf for  every t  ;:::  t 
and j  ~ nS  by L3.2. Suppose that b?  =  7r*;  then either  b~l <  7r*  or bP  -:- 7r*  for 
t  ;::: t by L10.2. If  b~l < 7r*, then LlD.1 again implies bfI < 7rt for each t  ;::: t + 1 and 
therefore  p;i  = rf for  every t  ;:::  t + 1 and j  ~  nS ,  by L3.2.  If  bfI  =  7r*  for  t  ;:::  t, 
since high-value buyers always trade when they are matched (by P2.2,  P2.1.2 and 
s·  L  P2.4.1),  then low-value buyers must also trade when matched;  hence Pt]  =  rt  for 
every t ;::: t + 1 and j  ~  nS. 
S.I  H 
We establish P2.4.3.  Suppose by way of contradiction that p:/  =  r[  for  some 
j'  ~  nS , and p?' = rt for some j" ~  nS  and i < t.  Then P2.4.2 implies p;i  = rf for 
every t > i and j  ~  n s.  In particular, p:i
l 
=  rf, which is  a contradiction. 
Finally, we  prove P2.5.  If pfi  =  rf for some j  ~  nS  then L3.4 implies b?  ~  7r[, 
and since b?  > 0 and r? - rf > 0 (by L5.1), we have rf - rf > o.  Hence pf;  =  rf 
for every i  ~  n L  by L2.1.  D 
Proof of Proposition 3:  We  prove P3.1.1.  Assume b?  <  7r*;  then b?  <  7r[ by 
L10.1,  and pfi  =  rf by  L3.2;  hence pfi  rf by P2.5  for  every i  ~ nL .  Thus 
I (pfi ,rf) = I (rf , pfi) = 1,  and therefore 
Since J1fi  =  1 - a  by L5.2, we have 
b!!  =  (1 - a)b?  = bij 
t+1  (1 - a) b? + (1 - a) bf  t  . 
Hence P3.1.1 holds. 
We  establish  P3.1.2.  Assume  by  =  7r*.  Then by  LlD.2  either  b~l <  7r*  or 
b? = ... = b!J = 7r*.  If  b~l < 7r* = br, then b~l < 7r[+1  (by LlD.1), and pf~l = rf+l 
for every j  ~  nS  by L3.2.  Hence 7r[ =  7r* > 0 by L8.1, and therefore rf > rf (because 
rp > rf by P2.1.2), and L2.1 implies pf;  =  rf for every i  ~  nL . 
If  bP = ... = bfJ = 7r*, since matched high-value buyers trade (and therefore exit 
the market) by P2.2, P2.1.2 and P2.4.1, then matched low-value buyers must also 
trade; hence for t  ;::: t, pf; = rf for every i  ~  nL andp;i = rf for every j  ~  nS.  Thus, 
P3.1.2 holds. 
56 We  show that P3.1.3  holds.  Suppose that bp  >  ?r*;  then bp  >  ?rt by Lemma 
L10.3, and therefore pfj  =  r[!  for  each j  ::; nS  by L3.4;  since r[!  > rf by L4.1, then 
I (rf , pfj) =  0 for  each j  ::; n s, and therefore for  each i  ::; n  L  we have 
nS  nS 
L·  a"",  s·  (L  s·  a"",  s·  L  S  J1t '  =  1 - 2" ~  A[  J I  Pt, r [J) - 2" ~  A[  J I (r[ , p/  ) 
j=1  j=1 
nS 
Q L  s·  (L  s.)  a  1 - - A_J I  Pt- r_J  > 1 - -.  2  t  't  - 2 
j=1 
Thus, since J.Lfi  =  1 - Q  by £6.2, we get 
b?-t-l  = 
(1 - a)b[! 
(1 - a)b!l +  bI:- ,,\,"}'L  A!:i ,/:i 
t  t  L.n=1  t  r--t 
(1- a)bp  H 
<  (1 - a) bp + (1 - ~)(  1 - bP)  < bt  . 
Therefore P3.1.3 holds. 
Finally, we establish P3.2.  Define the sequence {Qt}  by Qo  =  b{f,  and for t > 0 
b  _  (1 - a)Qt 
-HI - (1 - a)Qt + (1 - ~)(1 - Qt) 
We  show that bf > ?r*  implies bEt-I::;  Qt+1'  Assume bf > ?r*;  we show by induction 
that bf:  ::;  Qk  for  k ::; t + 1.  By construction bf!  ::;  Qo.  Assume that bf:  ::;  Qk  for  k ::; t; 
we show that bf:+l  ::; Qk+l'  Since {bf} is non-increasing by Lemma 7 and k ::; t, then 
bf!  2:  b~ > 7["*. Therefore P3.1.3 implies p~j =  r{!, and hence I(rf,p~j) =  0, for eyery 
j  ::;  n s. Therefore 
for every i  ::; nL . Thus, since  J1~i =  1 - a  by £6.2, we have 
b
H  - k+l  -
(1 - a)bf: 
(1 - Q)bH + bL ,,\,"}'L  ALi IILi  k  k L .. n=1  r--k 
<  (1 - Q)Q~  _ b 
(1 - a)Q~ + (1 - ~)(1 _ M;)  - -1' 
We  now  prove  P3.2.  If bf!  ::;  ?r*,  the P3.2  holds  for  T  =  O.  If bf!  >  ?r*,  let 
T =  T(b{f, a,  ?r*) be the first integer such that Qi'  < ?r*. Such integer exists, since 
(1 - a)tbH 
b  - 0 
-t - (1 - a)tb{f + (1 - ~)t(1 - bf!)' 
57 and therefore  H~t} converges to zero.  Suppose b¥  > 71"*;  then b¥_l  > 71"*  (by Lemma 
7),  and therefore b¥  ~  Qf'  < 71"*,  which is  a contradiction.  Thus b¥  ~  71"*,  and since 
{bfI}  is  a non-increasing sequence (Lemma 7), bfI  ~  71"*  for t  2::  T. Hence P3.2 holds. 
o 
Proof of Proposition 4:  By P3.2 there is T  =  T(b{f, a, 71"*)  such that bfI  ~  71"*  for 
t  2:: T.  Thus, P3.1.1 and P3.1.2 imply p~j =  rf < rfI for every j  ~ n S  and t  2:: T +  1, 
and therefore pfi = rf for every i  ~ nL  and t  2::  T + 1 by P2.5.  Also  p~i = rf for 
every i  ~ nH  and t  by P2.2.  Thus,  for  each 8 E  [0,1]  and T,  let r  E  r(8, T) be a 
sequence of equilibrium reservation prices and let V  be the corresponding sequence 
of expected utilities.  Since r[ = UT - 8~:;'-1 for  T  E {H, L}, and rf = C+8~~1 by El, 
traders expected utilities for t  2:: T +  1 are given by the system of difference equations 
v:H  2uH  - uL  - c  I-a 
Q  Q 
~~1  t  2"  2 
v:L  a 
uL  - c  +8  ~t1  ° 
l-Q.  _Q. 
t  2  2  2 
~S  uL  - C  ° 
Q  1-Q.  ~~1  -"2  2 
Thus, for every date after T =  T(b{f, a, 71"*)  traders expected utilities are uniquely 
determined.  Noting that ~s  and ~L  are determined independently of ~H, and using 
Vf+l  =  VI+1  =  0,  we can solve for  ~s and ~L, to obtain 
VS _  l!"L  _  ~( L  _  ) 1 - [8(1 - a)]T-t+l 
.  t  - t  - 2  u  c  1 _ 8(1 - a) 
Thus, for t  2:: T + 1 \Ye have 
L 
1·  1·  v:S  1·  1·  v:S  u  - c  lm  lm  t  =  lm  lm  t  =  , 
6->1 T->=  T->= 6->1  2 
and 
L 
1·  1·  v:L  1·  1·  v:L  U  - C  lm  lm  t  =  lm  lm  t  = 
6->1 T->=  T->= 6->1  2 
For high-value buyers, since Vf!.t1  =  0,  the above system yields for t  2:: T + 1 
v:H  a(  H  L  ) 1-[8(1- a)JT-t+l 
t  =  - 2u  - u  - c ---=--'------'--"---
2  1-8(1- a) 
Hence 
L 
Hm  lim  ~H  =  Hm  lim~H  =uH _  u  +c 
6->1 T->=  T->oo 6->1  2 
58 Now let t < T + 1.  A trader of type T  who is in the market at date t obtains an 
expected utility of V{ by following his equilibrium strategy; thus the expected utility 
to a trader who remains in the market at t must satisfy ~T ~  8T-tVi+1' for otherwise 
he benefits from a deviation where he makes unacceptable offers and rejects any offers 
until date T +  1, following his equilibrium strategy thereafter.  Also ~s  +  ~H  :S uH - c 




1·  1·  Tl'S  1·  1·  uS  u
L 
- c  1m  1m  v t  =  1m  1m  v t  = 
6-->1 T-->oo  T-->oo 6-->1  2 
1·  1·  TTH  1·  1·  uH _  H  u
L + c  1m  1m  v t  =  1m  1m  v  t  - U  - ---
6-->1 T-->oo  T-->oo 6-->1  2 
For low-value buyers we  have  ~s ~ ~L ~ 8T-
tV#+1'  where the first  inequality 
follows  from Lemma 11  and the second ,vas established above.  Thus, 
L 
lim  lim  v~  L  =  lim  lim v~  L  = U  - c, 
6-->1 T-->oo  T-->oo 6-->1  2 
Furthermore, since Tf  =  c +  8~!  1 and T;  =  UT - 8~~  1 for T E {H, £} by El, the 
above limits imply 
L 
1 ·  1·  T  1·  1·  T  U  + c  1m  1m  Tt  =  1m  1m Tt  =  , 
6--> 1 T -+00  T -->00 6--> 1  2 
for  T  E {H, £, S} and t.  0 
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